X.509

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X.509 Outline

► X.509 Overview

Certificate Lifecycle

Alternative Certification Models

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What is X.509?

- ► The most commonly used Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) on the web
- Public Key Infrastructure
 - Create, manage, distribute, and store certificates
- Certification Validation Path Algorithms
- Certificate Lifecycle Management
 - Certificate Revocation Lists

Assumptions and Goals

- Users of certificates will utilize them in a variety of environments
 - Certificates should be nonspecific in regards to environment
- Users of PKI will not necessarily be technologically sophisticated
 - Need for automated and deterministic forms of authentication and identification
- Large number of security dimensions/attributes
 - Minimize chances that CA administration mistake will result in broad compromise
 - Decrease the number of configuration choices necessary

X.509 Architecture

End entity

- Subjects or users of PKI certificates
- Certification Authority (CA)
 - Issues and signs certificates
 - Certification Practice Statement determined by each CA
- CRL issuer
 - May be the same entity as CA
- Repository
 - System that stores certificates and CRLs
 - Distributes them as necessary to end entities

Certificate	x
General Details Certification Path	
Certificate Information	
This certificate is intended for the following purpose(s):	
 Ensures the identity of a remote computer Proves your identity to a remote computer 2.16.840.1.113733.1.7.23.6 	
* Refer to the certification authority's statement for details.	
Issued to: www.bankofamerica.com	
Issued by: VeriSign Class 3 Extended Validation SSL CA	
Valid from 3/21/2013 to 3/22/2014	
Issuer Statement	
OK	
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Commercial Certification

- On the local level:
 - Extremely fragmented
- For websites:
 - Most use SSL certificates
 - Significant barriers to entry
 - Symantec 42.9%
 - Comodo Group 26%
 - ► Go Daddy 14%
 - ► Global Sign 7.7%



Certificate Structure

Certificate

- Version
- Subject
- Issuer
- Public key for Subject
- Validity period
 - Not Before
 - Not After
- Signature Algorithm
- Signature Field

Must be Distinguished Names:

- Unique identifier in CA's domain
- Can contain
 - Country
 - Organization
 - State or Province

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- Common name
- Serial Number

Extensions

- Allow for flexibility of certificates to contain additional fields
 - Critical vs. Non-critical extensions
- Common Extensions:
 - Authority Key Identifier means of identifying public key corresponding to private key used to sign
 - Subject Key Identifier identify certificates that contain particular public key
 - Key Usage defines purpose of key
 - Certificate Policy information

Certificate Lifecycle

- Once a CA verifies the credentials of a user, it can create and issue a certificate for that user
 - Policy matter context dependent
- After certificates are issued, they are either renewed or allowed to expire
- Can be revoked if:
 - CA has been compromised
 - User's secret key was leaked
 - Name was changed

Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

- Two major types of CRLs
 - Complete CRL signed and time-stamped list identifying revoked certificates
 - Delta CRL used for updates to the complete CRL
- Published periodically at defined interval
- Issues
 - Mistakes in revocation list
 - Access to most current CRLs
 - No guarantee that all certificate copies will be revoked

Comparisons to X.509

- PGP (Web of Trust model)
 - Introducer Model users are referred from one user to another (creating a "web")
 - Updates to the web are found by users themselves
 - No guarantee if or when the web will be up-to-date
 - No centralized entity
 - Not scalable, but potentially preferable in a small group

- ► X.509
 - Users trust CAs, rather than each other (transitive trust)
 - Hierarchical certification validation from centralized entities
 - Updates managed by CAs
 - Scalable

Practical Implications of X.509

- Each browser has a built in set of predetermined "trusted root CAs" to facilitate SSL transactions
 - The browser developers determine the primary CA's that are trusted third parties to the users
- The Internet is all about decentralization, but X.509 relies on a few number of centralized authorities.
 - Usage of duplicate RSA-moduli keys, man-in-the-middle attacks, etc. have all occurred in the last few years
 - Can we trust them? If not, what alternatives do we have?
 - Is this an issue? Do we need a large number of providers?