Message-ID: <25475016.1075851010688.JavaMail.evans@thyme> Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2000 05:13:00 -0700 (PDT) From: james.steffes@enron.com To: rick.carson@enron.com, harry.kingerski@enron.com, john.neslage@enron.com, vladimir.gorny@enron.com Subject: EES Presentation Cc: richard.shapiro@enron.com, steven.kean@enron.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Bcc: richard.shapiro@enron.com, steven.kean@enron.com X-From: James D Steffes X-To: Rick L Carson, Harry Kingerski, John Neslage, Vladimir Gorny X-cc: Richard Shapiro, Steven J Kean X-bcc: X-Folder: \Steven_Kean_Oct2001_2\Notes Folders\Attachments X-Origin: KEAN-S X-FileName: skean.nsf Rick -- Some thoughts and actions from Govt Affairs. 1. On pg 2 of the Presentation, you state an equation: Commodity Transactions + Bundled Transactions + Upsell = Total Savings. Isn't it better to define the result as "Total Value Created" rather than Total Savings. Then you can split the value between "EES Profit" and "Customer Savings"? EES is creating value by (a) commodity management and (b) DSM. They are then responsible for finding the balance in negotiations with the customer between themselves (profit) and the customer (savings). This definition more closely works with the numerical findings on page 9. The discussion on page 11 is also confusing. What are "EES Projected Savings"? Don't you mean EES Projected Earnings? Just a thought. Not critical to my section. 2. Page 8 identifies $14.7 MM as the "Worst Case Stress Test" for the 39.6 Twh of Regulated Commodity. Govt Affairs is doing an analysis on this to make sure that we are comfortable with the results. There are two problems: (1) a 5% parallel shift in Regulated Commodity curves is probably not the "Worst Case" and (2) the data from EES is difficult to obtain. We think that a better measure would be to find the potential loss if regulated rates continue to grow at their historic growth factor = 1985 - 1995 was .7% a year. The problem is that it is difficult to compute because the EES systems don't give us a nice and easy structure to evaluate. John Nesalge is working on this number. 3. Page 9 identifies the Regulatory Risk Capital as $9.5MM for the Top 5 Commodity deals. We are checking on this. It has been hard to compute. Same problems as #2. I would say that $9.5MM is at least the overall Regulatory Risk Capital. John Neslage is working on this number. 4. Page 8 uses the terms "Wholesale" and "Regulated". Page 4 uses the terms "Wholesale" and "Retail". I assume that you are thinking about the same set of costs / services? If I am correct, I would change the term on page 4 to "Regulated Price Reduction" or otherwise explain the difference / similarity. 5. We are working on identifying the value at risk for the PG&E position (California CTC roll-off). There is also a growing Regulatory Risk on Illinois CTC roll-off = EES is assuming that the CTC ends in Illinois one year earlier than the current law allows. We may also try to calculate this figure. My understanding is that these numbers will not be incorporated into the presentation but will be provided to Rick Buy as FYI. Is that correct? John Neslage is working on these numbers. 6. Conclusion page 13. Point #4 dealing with Regulatory Risk. Can we change the presentation to state the following: FINDINGS EES' Regulated Rate forecasts do not document legal, political, and regulatory assumptions. Enron Government Affairs has not uniformly validated key Regulated Rate forecast assumptions. Very limited ability to hedge Regulated Rate risk. EXPOSURE We are working on trying to quantify. Should say "Rate Growth at Historic 85-95 Levels = $XX MM". RECOMMENDATIONS EES should document all legal, political, and regulatory assumptions embedded within Regulated Rate forecasts. Enron Government Affairs should provide regular input into forecasting process to ensure Regulated Rate forecasts incorporate all relevant information. Enron Government Affairs should perform monthly curve review process on critical rate forecasts. Finally, I hope that John Neslage will have these figures by end of business Tuesday. Does this work? Please call either John or Harry to coordinate. I am leaving for South America today. JDS ---------------------- Forwarded by James D Steffes/HOU/EES on 04/09/2000 10:41 AM --------------------------- From: Rick L Carson@ECT on 04/06/2000 05:57 PM To: Rick Buy/HOU/ECT@ECT cc: Don Rollins/HOU/ECT@ECT, James L Copeland/HOU/ECT@ECT, Stephanie McGinnis/HOU/ECT@ECT, Ted Murphy/HOU/ECT@ECT, Vladimir Gorny/HOU/ECT@ECT, David Gorte/HOU/ECT@ECT, Karen L Barbour/HOU/ECT@ECT, Mark Ruane/HOU/ECT@ECT, Jeffrey A Soo/HOU/ECT@ECT, William S Bradford/HOU/ECT@ECT, Molly Harris/HOU/ECT@ECT, James D Steffes/HOU/EES@EES Subject: EES Presentation Rick: Attached is our latest version of the EES presentation. All of the numbers are pretty complete: we may have a sensitivity on California CTC roll-off from Gov't Affairs but other than that we're just double checking all the numbers. EES shows a much greater projected savings (net to EES) than we do on the Suiza deal so we are reconciling that issue. The only other major change from what you had seen previously is to move the Owens deal to commodity. Karen Barbour pointed out that there is no guaranteed savings on the Owens deal; only a shared savings (if savings occur). By copy of this letter, I am asking all our team members to review the latest version of the presentation and be prepared to meet with you when you return. See you soon! Rick C.