Message-ID: <28341467.1075846371104.JavaMail.evans@thyme> Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2000 06:50:00 -0700 (PDT) From: richard.shapiro@enron.com To: steven.kean@enron.com Subject: Joe's group accomplishments in 2000 SO FAR!! Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-From: Richard Shapiro X-To: Steven J Kean X-cc: X-bcc: X-Folder: \Steven_Kean_Dec2000_1\Notes Folders\Reg risk X-Origin: KEAN-S X-FileName: skean.nsf FYI ---------------------- Forwarded by Richard Shapiro/HOU/EES on 04/05/2000= =20 01:50 PM --------------------------- From: Christi L Nicolay@ECT on 04/05/2000 01:49 PM To: James D Steffes/HOU/EES@EES, Richard Shapiro/HOU/EES@EES cc: Joe Hartsoe/Corp/Enron@Enron, Sarah Novosel/Corp/Enron@Enron, Charles= =20 Yeung/HOU/ECT@ECT, Richard Ingersoll/HOU/ECT@ECT=20 Subject: Joe's group accomplishments in 2000 SO FAR!! Per Jim's request for the database. (I don't know if you want to put the= =20 values that Kevin is giving into the database). =20 (1) Completed the negotiations and FERC filing of the Next Hour Market=20 scheduling proposal. When implemented, scheduled for June 2000, this will= =20 provide one stop shopping for next hour business. Ties OASIS and TAGGING= =20 together into one request. Also if a tranmission provider cuts the=20 transmission the PSE only pays for his actual use versus what he originally= =20 scheduled. This will speed up the ability to schedule the next hour=20 non-firm. This order is an important recognition by FERC that its OATT did= =20 not cover hourly, which we complained about alot at FERC's hotline last=20 summer. 2) Successful in obtaining the release of all ISN (system information) to= =20 marketers in the WSCC region. This was an individual effort by Dick that h= as=20 been benificial for our traders in the WEST. Successfully prevented the WS= CC=20 Operating Committee from taking action that would have reversed this effort= . =20 3) Assisted in getting the initial control areas in SERC approved last ye= ar=20 and preventing ATC changes this year and OC changes that would have negated= =20 the Control Area effort. 4) Dick served as Co CHAIR of the ISO committee that put the SPP contract= =20 in place that eliminated MW mile pricing in SPP and will serve as the basis= =20 for SPP's RTO. =20 5) Dick was appointed to the NERC Control Area Task Force which was formed= =20 as a result of our the success of the Enron Control Areas in TVA and have s= o=20 far been successful in keeping this effort so that it is non punitive. Thi= s=20 has turned into a very positive process that may result in a new=20 configuration of the NERC relibiability effort. (6) Dick's made comments to ENTERGY that helped push Entergy into filing= =20 their new scheduling procedure (ultimate source and sink) with FERC. This= =20 was initially going to be implemented unilaterally March 1 without a FERC= =20 filing and Enron would have been forced into an after the fact complaint=20 situation at FERC where we are not allowed to get damages that we would hav= e=20 incurred in the meantime (See Comm. Massey's concurrence in Aquila v. Enter= gy=20 about the lack of incentive to file complaints). Kevin Presto said that=20 winning the protest at FERC (due 4/12) would be worth $100 MM. (7) On 2/2, TECO revised its proposed generator imbalance charge from=20 minute by minute to hourly accountability (notably, TECO revised its propos= al=20 before FERC issued an order based on the EPSA protest herein.) We worked wi= th=20 EPSA to file an EPSA protest to TECO=01,s proposal. We didn=01,t like TECO= 's=20 proposal but had commercial concerns about filing a protest in our own name= =20 (since Enron is working with TECO on a project). We were able to get EPSA= =20 to protest this issue in TECO's initial filing. Enron is planning to site= =20 generation in Florida, but we don't have the value on this win yet. (8) FERC issued a NOPR on January 28 proposing to revise the= =20 way it assesses annual charges to public utilities. Enron, along with=20 several other participants (Dynegy, Koch, APX, Citizens, NP Energy, Sonat a= nd=20 Williams), filed a petition for rulemaking with FERC in August, 1998,=20 requesting FERC to revise its methodology for assessing annual charges,=20 arguing that FERC's current system of assessing annual charges on sales for= =20 resale of power discourages trading, impedes reliance on competitive market= s=20 for power, and could create competitive advantages for utilities over new= =20 power marketers entering the market. We proposed that FERC either assess i= ts=20 costs on transmission only, or reallocate the amounts that it collects=20 through sales transactions versus transmission transactions. Although FERC= =20 does not grant our petition and in fact dismisses it as moot, the petition= =20 served its purpose. In the NOPR, FERC notes that because most of its time is spent on=20 transmission issues (a point that we made in the Petition), it is appropria= te=20 to assess costs only on the MWh of electric energy transmitted in interstat= e=20 commerce by public utilities. Under the current assessment system, FERC=20 divides its costs between transmission and sales. Now FERC is proposing to= =20 collect its costs solely through transmission. FERC justifies this change= =20 because it spends most of its time on transmission issues, and because=20 transmission providers can collect the fees through transmission charges=20 assessed to users of the grid. FERC proposes to asses its costs to 1)=20 unbundled wholesale transmission; 2) unbundled retail transmission; and 3)= =20 bundled wholesale power sales. Bundled native load transactions will=20 apparently avoid assessments of any FERC-related costs; however, EPSA and= =20 Enron are protesting this issue at FERC. (Jim Steffes has been working on = a=20 calculation of additional value.) (9) Interconnection Policy =01) Utilizing EPSA efforts, including Sarah's= =20 meeting with FERC, we got the policy statement we urged FERC to put forth (= in=20 the forum we suggested, i.e., an existing proceeding) in the Tennessee Powe= r=20 order where FERC said interconnection procedures should follow the pro form= a=20 tariff, including that a generator doesn't have to request transmission and= =20 interconnection at the same time. We worked with EPSA to draft the "Model"= =20 interconnection agreement that EPSA filed at FERC in the Entergy=20 interconnection proposal. (10) AEP/CSW order =01) approved the merger but accepted intervenors=01,= =20 testimony showing market power and conditioned merger on an independent=20 calculation of ATC postings (which we proposed) and independent market=20 monitor soon after the merger occurs with RTO participation by 12/15/01. = =20 Kevin Presto said the independent ATC calculation is worth $20 MM to Enron.= =20 (Note: we are going to propose MAIN instead of SPP, which AEP chose.). Kev= in=20 said that AEP's ATC calculation can trump all interfaces in ECAR, so this h= as=20 a positive effect not just on AEP, but on all of ECAR. (11) MAPP =01) FERC further order on refunds. MAPP refused to refund moni= es=20 that it was unable to collect from a non-jurisdictional member transmission= =20 owner, NPPD. EPMI filed a protest to MAPP=01,s refund report, arguing that= MAPP=20 was ordered to make full refunds and it violated that order. FERC agreed= =20 with Enron and rejected MAPP=01,s refund report. FERC said MAPP must refun= d the=20 full amount to transmission customers, whether or not it was able to collec= t=20 that money from NPPD. Results in another $50,000 of refunds for EPMI. (12) Sarah is working on the PGE sale.