CPSC 467: Cryptography and Computer Security

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Lecture 4
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Analyzing Confidentiality of Cryptosystems

- Secret ballot elections
- Information protection
- Adversaries with unlimited power
- Computationally limited adversaries
- Kinds of attacks
Analyzing Confidentiality of Cryptosystems
Election example

What does *confidentiality* mean in a secret-ballot election?

Some proposed definitions:

1. Nobody knows if I voted.
2. Nobody knows how I voted.
3. Nobody gets any information about how I voted other than what could be inferred from the election returns.

Why might these properties be important?

What is the difference between 2 and 3?
Confidentiality and information

*Information* is central to the notion of *confidentiality*.

Information is what is to be protected; not its representation by data.

Indeed, ciphertext is *public data* that nonetheless hides secret information.

The adversary generally has some prior knowledge about the secret.

Confidentiality protection means limiting the amount of new information that the adversary can acquire, given reasonable assumptions about the adversary’s prior knowledge and capabilities.
What is new information?

New information is anything that Eve learns from the ciphertext that she didn’t know before.

Here are some things that she might learn:

1. The length of the message is 6.
2. The ciphertext of the message is EXB JXQ.
3. The third letter of the message is either e or y.
4. The message is either hae mat or buy gun.
5. The message is buy gun.
6. The encryption key is 3.

Questions for protecting each kind of information:

- How important is it to protect?
- How hard is it to protect?
What if Eve only sometimes succeeds?

Eve might only succeed on certain runs of the protocol.

For example, suppose Eve already knows that EXB JXQ means buy gun. Then without any knowledge of the key or even the kind of cryptosystem in use, if she sees EXB JXQ, she knows what it means.

Is this a serious security breach? Why or why not?

What are you assuming about the likelihood of different messages?
What if Eve knows the message in advance?

Suppose knows *in advance* that the message is *buy gun* but *does not* know the ciphertext.

When she sees the ciphertext *EXB JXQ*, she can immediately output the decryption *buy gun*.

Does this mean that she has broken the cryptosystem?

Does this mean that she has deciphered the message?

Can she convince Fred that her decryption is correct?

Does this matter?
Imperfect attacks

Eve does not always have to succeed to do damage.

**Weak keys**  
Eve can decrypt messages encrypted with keys from some subset $K \subseteq K$ of “weak” keys.  
The larger $K$ is, the more serious the compromise.

**Uncertain message recovery**  
Eve can narrow down the possible plaintexts but is uncertain about the actual message.

**Probabilistic algorithms**  
Eve’s attack may be randomized and only succeed with some small probability.

**Partial information**  
Eve can discover some information about $m$.  
Example: In many cryptosystems, she always learns the length of $m$.

What kinds of compromise are acceptable?
How much protection is needed?

A naive claim of confidentiality: **Eve can’t find the key.**

This definition is both too strong and too weak.

**Too strong** We can’t always prevent Eve from obtaining $k$.

- She can guess the key at random and will sometimes be right.
- She can try all possible keys, given enough time.

**Too weak** The goal of a cryptosystem is to keep $m$ confidential. A system in which Eve can decrypt Alice’s messages is totally insecure, whether or not she learns the key.

Can you find an example where Eve can decrypt messages but not find the key?
A more nuanced approach

Some compromises of decreasing difficulty for Eve:

**Complete break**  Eve can find the key $k$.
  - Can read all messages between Alice and Bob.
  - Can send encrypted messages to Bob.

**Complete message recovery**  Eve can decrypt all messages $m$.
  - Can read all messages between Alice and Bob.
  - Cannot encrypt her own messages to fool Bob.

**Selected message recovery**  Eve can decrypt some subset $M \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ of messages. The larger $M$ is, the more serious the compromise.
Adversaries of unlimited power

A cryptosystem that can resist attack from an adversary of unlimited power is *information-theoretically* secure.

We saw last time that the Vernam cipher (or one-time pad) is information-theoretically secure.

- An adversary of unlimited power can always carry out a brute force attack.
- Every possible decryption can be enumerated.
- Security relies on the adversary being unable to distinguish correct from incorrect decryptions.
Short keys

Any cryptosystem with short keys automatically gives away a lot of information about the plaintext – namely, it is the decryption of the given ciphertext under one of the possible keys.

If the key space is small and the adversary has sufficient power, then the adversary can get considerable partial information about the message.

In real-life situations, the adversary does not have unlimited time and space in order to break the cipher. The goal of the cipher is to make it costly for the adversary but not necessarily impossible.
Measuring computational difficulty

We want a notion of how much time is required to carry out a computational task.

Why not use actual running time?

- It depends on the speed of the computer as well as on the algorithm for computing the function.
- It varies from one input to another.
- It is difficult to analyze at a fine grained level of detail.
Role of complexity theory

Complexity theory allows one to make meaningful statements about the *asymptotic* difficulty of computational problems, independent of the particular computer or programming language.

Complexity measures *rate of growth* of worst-case running time as a function of the length $n$ of the inputs.

An algorithm runs in time $T(n)$ if its running time on all but finitely many inputs $x$ is at most $T(|x|)$.

An algorithm runs in *polynomial time* if it runs in time $p(n)$ for some polynomial function $p(n)$.

A function $f$ is *polynomial time* if it is computable by some polynomial time algorithm.
Feasibility

The computational complexity of a cryptosystem measures how the time to encrypt and decrypt grows as a function of an underlying security parameter $s$.

Polynomial time functions are said to be feasible.

Feasibility is a minimal requirement.

In practice, we care about the actual run time for fixed values of the security parameter (such as $s = 512$).
Quantifying computational difficulty

Recall the computational requirements for a symmetric cryptosystem:

**Feasibility**  $E$ and $D$, regarded as functions of two arguments, should be computable using a feasible amount of time and storage.

**Security (weak)** It should be difficult to find $m$ given $c = E_k(m)$ without knowing $k$.

**Goal:** Quantify these notions.

Intuitively, we want a probabilistic polynomial time adversary to succeed in an attack with at most negligible probability.
Eve’s information

Until now, we’ve implicitly assumed that Eve has no information about the cryptosystem except for the encryption and decryption methods and the ciphertext $c$.

In practice, Eve might know much more.

- She probably knows (or has a good idea) of the message distribution.
- She might have obtained several other ciphertexts.
- She might have learned the decryptions of earlier ciphertexts.
- She might have even chosen the earlier messages or ciphertexts herself.

This leads us to consider several attack scenarios.
Attack scenarios

Ciphertext-only attack  Eve knows only $c$ and tries to recover $m$.

Known plaintext attack  Eve knows $c$ and a sequence of plaintext-ciphertext pairs $(m_1, c_1), \ldots, (m_r, c_r)$ where $c \not\in \{c_1, \ldots, c_r\}$. She tries to recover $m$. 
Known plaintext attacks

A known plaintext attack can occur when

1. Alice uses the same key to encrypt several messages;
2. Eve later learns or successfully guesses the corresponding plaintexts.

Some ways that Eve learns plaintexts.

- The plaintext might be publicly revealed at a later time, e.g., sealed bid auctions.
- The plaintext might be guessable, e.g., an email header.
- Eve might later discover the decrypted message on Bob’s computer.
Chosen text attack scenarios

Still stronger attack scenarios allow Eve to choose one element of a plaintext-ciphertext pair and obtain the other.

**Chosen plaintext attack** Like a known plaintext attack, except that Eve chooses messages $m_1, \ldots, m_r$ before getting $c$ and Alice (or Bob) encrypts them for her.

**Chosen ciphertext attack** Like a known plaintext attack, except that Eve chooses ciphertexts $c_1, \ldots, c_r$ before getting $c$ and Alice (or Bob) decrypts them for her.

**Mixed chosen plaintext/chosen ciphertext attack** Eve chooses some plaintexts and some ciphertexts and gets the corresponding decryptions or encryptions.
Why would Alice cooperate in a chosen plaintext attack?

- Eve might be authorized to generate messages that are then encrypted and sent to Bob, but she isn’t authorized to read other people’s messages.\(^1\)
- Alice might be an internet server, not a person, that encrypts messages received in the course of carrying out a more complicated cryptographic protocol.\(^2\)
- Eve might gain access to Alice’s computer, perhaps only for a short time, when Alice steps away from her desk.

\(^1\)Nothing we have said implies that Eve is unknown to Alice and Bob or that she isn’t also a legitimate participant in the protocol.
\(^2\)We will see such protocols later in the course.
Adaptive chosen text attack scenarios

Adaptive versions of chosen text protocols are when Eve chooses her texts one at a time after learning the response to her previous text.

**Adaptive chosen plaintext attack**  Eve chooses the messages \( m_1, m_2, \ldots \) one at a time rather than all at once.
Thus, \( m_2 \) depends on \((m_1, c_1)\), \( m_3 \) depends on both \((m_1, c_1)\) and \((m_2, c_2)\), etc.

**Adaptive chosen ciphertext and adaptive mixed attacks**  are defined similarly.