


I 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 units
 1 2 3 4 5 6 $1+2+3=6$

II 0 0 0 6 6 6 II wins
 4+5+6=15

$\frac{0}{1}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{0}{3}$ $\frac{7}{4}$ $\frac{10}{5}$ $\frac{0}{6}$ $1+4+5=10$
 $\frac{1}{1}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{3}{3}$ $\frac{6}{4}$ $\frac{6}{5}$ $\frac{1}{6}$ $1+4+5=10$
 $\frac{3}{1}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{3}$ $\frac{2}{4}$ $\frac{4}{5}$ $\frac{7}{6}$ $1+1+3+6=11$

I $a_1 a_2 \dots a_6$
 $b_1 b_2 \dots b_6$

$\sum_{i=1}^6 v_i \cdot \frac{a_i^2}{a_i^2 + b_i^2}$
 PI winning
 maximize score, battlefield winners probabilistic



-- verify : lead X , determine if (X, X) is equil.

-- find : find X s.t. (X, X) is equil.

Linear Programming

	F	C	S
F	0.30	0.25	0.20
C	0.26	0.33	0.28
S	0.28	0.30	0.33

Find $\underline{x} = (x_1, x_2, x_3)$ that satisfies

$$E(x, 1) = 0.30x_1 + 0.26x_2 + 0.28x_3 \geq v$$

$$E(x, 2) = 0.25x_1 + 0.33x_2 + 0.30x_3 \geq v$$

$$E(x, 3) = 0.20x_1 + 0.28x_2 + 0.33x_3 \geq v$$

Linear programming
(scipy.linprog)

$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$$

$$x_1, x_2, x_3 \geq 0$$

and maximizes v

divide by v to eliminate v

(after ensuring that $v > 0$)

[by adding a c to A to make all entries > 0]

$$-0.30 \frac{x_1}{v} - 0.26 \frac{x_2}{v} - 0.28 \frac{x_3}{v} \leq -1$$

$$-0.25 \frac{x_1}{v} - 0.33 \frac{x_2}{v} - 0.30 \frac{x_3}{v} \leq -1$$

$$-0.20 \frac{x_1}{v} - 0.28 \frac{x_2}{v} - 0.33 \frac{x_3}{v} \leq -1$$

maximize v



minimize $p_1 + p_2 + p_3$

$$= \frac{x_1}{v} + \frac{x_2}{v} + \frac{x_3}{v} = \frac{(x_1 + x_2 + x_3)}{v} = \frac{1}{v}$$

let $p_i = \frac{x_i}{v}$

$$-0.30 p_1 - 0.26 p_2 - 0.28 p_3 \leq -1$$

$$-0.25 p_1 - 0.33 p_2 - 0.30 p_3 \leq -1$$

$$-0.20 p_1 - 0.28 p_2 - 0.33 p_3 \leq -1$$

b-ub

al \uparrow

and $0 \leq p_i = \frac{x_i}{v} \leq \frac{1}{v} \leq 5$

bounds
(0, 5)

result x

since $x_i \leq 1$

result fin

because $v \geq 0.20$

lowest value in payoff matrix

LP returns (p_1, p_2, p_3) and $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = \frac{1}{v}$

recover x_i with $x_i = p_i \cdot v = \frac{p_i}{p_1 + p_2 + p_3}$

$$p_i = \frac{x_i}{v}$$

$$x_i = v \cdot p_i$$

II

minimize v subject to

$$E(1, Y) = 0.30y_1 + 0.25y_2 + 0.20y_3 \leq v$$

$$E(2, Y) = 0.26y_1 + 0.33y_2 + 0.28y_3 \leq v$$

$$E(3, Y) = 0.28y_1 + 0.30y_2 + 0.33y_3 \leq v$$

$$E(z, y) = 0.26y_1 + 0.25y_2 + 0.28y_3 \leq v$$

$$E(z, y) = 0.28y_1 + 0.30y_2 + 0.33y_3 \leq v$$

↓ divide by v , replace $\frac{y_i}{v}$ with g_i

find g_1, g_2, g_3 to minimize $-g_1 - g_2 - g_3 = -\frac{1}{v}$



$$c = (-1, -1, \dots, -1)$$

$a_1 = A$

$$\begin{aligned} 0.30g_1 + 0.25g_2 + 0.20g_3 &\leq 1 \\ 0.26g_1 + 0.33g_2 + 0.28g_3 &\leq 1 \\ 0.28g_1 + 0.30g_2 + 0.33g_3 &\leq 1 \end{aligned}$$

$$b_{-ub} = (1, \dots, 1)$$

$$0 \leq g_i \leq 5$$

bounds

LP returns g_i and $-g_1 - g_2 - g_3$

$$v = \frac{1}{g_1 + g_2 + g_3}$$

recover y_i with $y_i = g_i \cdot v = \frac{g_i}{g_1 + g_2 + g_3}$

Non-constant sum

X, Y is equilibrium if and only if $E_I(i, Y) \leq E_I(X, Y)$ for all i
 $E_{II}(X, j) \leq E_{II}(X, Y)$ for all j

$$F \quad \begin{matrix} F & 0 \\ 4, 1 & 0, 0 \\ 0, 0 & 1, 3 \end{matrix}$$

$$X = \left(\frac{3}{4} \quad \frac{1}{4} \right) \quad Y = \left(\frac{1}{5} \quad \frac{4}{5} \right)$$

Non linear programming : maximize $E_I(X, Y) + E_{II}(X, Y) - P - b$

subject to

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m x_i \cdot y_j \cdot a_{ij}$$


nonlinear!

value of game for I
value of game for II

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} \frac{3}{4} & -1 & 2 \\ 2 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 2 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 2 & \frac{1}{5} \\ 1 & -1 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & \frac{4}{5} \end{pmatrix}$$

Extensive Form: free form



Policy:
 function from pure states \rightarrow (actions)
 mixed: prob dist over actions

Normal Form: matrix
 1) I and II pick policies
 2) play game according to policies

middle middle corner
 $\# \quad \# \quad \# \quad \# \quad \# \quad \# \quad \dots$



state $0 \dots 10^{20}$
 an action ≈ 6 options class $6 \approx 40$
 $\#$ pure strategies = $40^{(10^{20})}$

One-Card Poker

Each player antes 1 unit

Deal one card to each player

P1 bets 1 or 0

bet "check"

P2 call (add 1 to pot)

fold

bet

check

P1 call


fold

4 card deck A, K, Q, J of clubs

P1 strategy:



P2 strategy:



P1	P2	
A	K	+2
A	Q	+1
A	J	-2
K	A	+1
K	Q	+1
K	J	-1
Q	A	-1
Q	K	+1
Q	J	-2
J	A	-2
J	K	-2
J	Q	+1

