

## CPSC 367: Cryptography and Security

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#### Integers Modulo n

#### Multiplicative Subgroup of $Z_n$

Greatest common divisor Multiplicative subgroup of  $Z_n$ 

Discrete Logarithm

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Outline	Zn	Z <sup>*</sup> <sub>n</sub>	Discrete log	Diffie-Hellman
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# Integers Modulo n



#### The mod relation

We saw in <u>lecture 9</u> that mod is a binary operation on integers. Mod is also used to denote a relationship on integers:

 $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$  iff  $n \mid (a - b)$ .

That is, a and b have the same remainder when divided by n. An immediate consequence of this definition is that

 $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$  iff  $(a \mod n) = (b \mod n)$ .

Thus, the two notions of mod aren't so different after all!

We sometimes write  $a \equiv_n b$  to mean  $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ .

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#### Divides

*b* divides *a* (exactly), written  $b \mid a$ , in case  $a \equiv 0 \pmod{b}$  (or equivalently, a = bq for some integer *q*).

#### Fact

If d|(a + b), then either d divides both a and b, or d divides neither of them.

#### Proof.

Suppose d | (a + b) and d | a. Then  $a + b = dq_1$  and  $a = dq_2$  for some integers  $q_1$  and  $q_2$ . Substituting for a and solving for b, we get

$$b = dq_1 - dq_2 = d(q_1 - q_2).$$

Hence,  $d \mid b$ .

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#### Mod is an equivalence relation

The two-place relationship  $\equiv_n$  is an *equivalence relation*.

The relation  $\equiv_n$  partitions the integers **Z** into *n* pairwise disjoint infinite sets  $C_0, \ldots, C_{n-1}$ , called *residue classes*, such that:

- 1. Every integer is in a unique residue class;
- 2. Integers x and y are equivalent (mod n) if and only if they are members of the same residue class.

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#### Representatives for residue classes

The unique class  $C_j$  containing integer b is denoted by  $[b]_{\equiv_n}$  or simply by [b].

Fact

$$[a] = [b]$$
 iff  $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ .

If  $x \in [b]$ , then x is said to be a *representative* or *name* of the residue class [b]. Obviously, b is a representative of [b].

For example, if n = 7, then [-11], [-4], [3], [10], [17] are all names for the same residue class

$$C_3 = \{\ldots, -11, -4, 3, 10, 17, \ldots\}.$$

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#### Canonical names

The *canonical* or preferred name for the class [b] is the unique representative x of [b] in the range  $0 \le x \le n-1$ .

For example, if n = 7, the canonical name for [10] is 3.

Why is the canonical name unique?

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Mod is a congruence relation

#### Definition

The relation  $\equiv$  is a *congruence relation* with respect to addition, subtraction, and multiplication of integers if

- $1.~\equiv$  is an equivalence relation, and
- 2. for each arithmetic operation  $\odot \in \{+, -, \times\}$ , if  $a \equiv a'$  and  $b \equiv b'$ , then  $a \odot b \equiv a' \odot b'$ .

The class containing the result of  $a \odot b$  depends only on the classes to which a and b belong and not the particular representatives chosen. Thus,

$$[a \odot b] = [a' \odot b'].$$

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#### Operations on residue classes

We can extend our operations to work directly on the family of residue classes (rather than on integers).

Let  $\odot$  be an arithmetic operation in  $\{+, -, \times\}$ , and let [a] and [b] be residue classes. Define  $[a] \odot [b] = [a \odot b]$ .

If you've followed everything so far, it should be no surprise that the canonical name for  $[a \odot b]$  is  $(a \odot b) \mod n!$ 

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# Multiplicative Subgroup of $Z_n$

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GCD				

#### Greatest common divisor

#### Definition

The greatest common divisor of two integers a and b, written gcd(a, b), is the largest integer d such that  $d \mid a$  and  $d \mid b$ .

gcd(a, b) is always defined unless a = b = 0 since 1 is a divisor of every integer, and the divisor of a non-zero number cannot be larger (in absolute value) than the number itself.

Question: Why isn't gcd(0,0) well defined?

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#### Computing the GCD

gcd(*a*, *b*) is easily computed if *a* and *b* are given in factored form. Namely, let  $p_i$  be the *i*<sup>th</sup> prime. Write  $a = \prod p_i^{e_i}$  and  $b = \prod p_i^{f_i}$ .

Then

 $gcd(a, b) = \prod p_i^{\min(e_i, f_i)}.$ 

Example:  $168 = 2^3 \cdot 3 \cdot 7$  and  $450 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5^2$ , so  $gcd(168, 450) = 2 \cdot 3 = 6$ .

However, factoring is believed to be a hard problem, and no polynomial-time factorization algorithm is currently known. (If it were easy, then Eve could use it to break RSA, and RSA would be of no interest as a cryptosystem.)

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GCD				

#### Euclidean algorithm

Fortunately, gcd(a, b) can be computed efficiently without the need to factor *a* and *b* using the famous *Euclidean algorithm*.

Euclid's algorithm is remarkable, not only because it was discovered a very long time ago, but also because it works without knowing the factorization of a and b.

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#### Euclidean identities

The Euclidean algorithm relies on several identities satisfied by the gcd function. In the following, assume a > 0 and  $a \ge b \ge 0$ :

$$gcd(a,b) = gcd(b,a)$$
(1)

$$gcd(a,0) = a \tag{2}$$

$$gcd(a, b) = gcd(a - b, b)$$
 (3)

Identity 1 is obvious from the definition of gcd. Identity 2 follows from the fact that every positive integer divides 0. Identity 3 follows from the basic fact relating divides and addition on slide 5.

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#### Computing GCD without factoring

The Euclidean identities allow the problem of computing gcd(a, b) to be reduced to the problem of computing gcd(a - b, b).

The new problem is "smaller" as long as b > 0.

The size of the problem gcd(a, b) is |a| + |b|, the sum of the absolute value of the two arguments.

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GCD				

#### An easy recursive GCD algorithm

```
int gcd(int a, int b)
{
    if ( a < b ) return gcd(b, a);
    else if ( b == 0 ) return a;
    else return gcd(a-b, b);
}</pre>
```

This algorithm is not very efficient, as you will quickly discover if you attempt to use it, say, to compute gcd(1000000, 2).

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#### Repeated subtraction

Repeatedly applying identity (3) to the pair (a, b) until it can't be applied any more produces the sequence of pairs

 $(a, b), (a - b, b), (a - 2b, b), \dots, (a - qb, b).$ 

The sequence stops when a - qb < b.

How many times you can subtract *b* from *a* while remaining non-negative? Answer: The quotient  $q = \lfloor a/b \rfloor$ .

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Using division in place of repeated subtractions

The amout a - qb that is left after q subtractions is just the remainder  $a \mod b$ .

Hence, one can go directly from the pair (a, b) to the pair  $(a \mod b, b)$ .

This proves the identity

 $gcd(a, b) = gcd(a \mod b, b).$ (4)

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GCD				

# Full Euclidean algorithm Recall the inefficient GCD algorithm. int gcd(int a, int b) {

```
if ( a < b ) return gcd(b, a);
else if ( b == 0 ) return a;
```

```
else return gcd(a-b, b);
```

```
}
```

The following algorithm is exponentially faster.

```
int gcd(int a, int b) {
    if ( b == 0 ) return a;
    else return gcd(b, a%b);
```

}

Principal change: Replace gcd(a-b,b) with gcd(b, a%). Besides collapsing repeated subtractions, we have  $a \ge b$  for all but the top-level call on gcd(a, b). This eliminates roughly half of the remaining recursive calls.

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## Complexity of GCD

The new algorithm requires at most in O(n) stages, where *n* is the sum of the lengths of *a* and *b* when written in binary notation, and each stage involves at most one remainder computation.

The following iterative version eliminates the stack overhead:

```
int gcd(int a, int b) {
    int aa;
    while (b > 0) {
        aa = a;
        a = b;
        b = aa % b;
    }
    return a;
}
```



#### Relatively prime numbers

Two integers *a* and *b* are *relatively prime* if they have no common prime factors.

Equivalently, a and b are relatively prime if gcd(a, b) = 1.

Let  $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$  be the set of integers in  $\mathbf{Z}_n$  that are relatively prime to *n*, so

$$\mathbf{Z}_n^* = \{ a \in \mathbf{Z}_n \mid \gcd(a, n) = 1 \}.$$

Example:

$$\textbf{Z}_{21}^{*} = \{1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20\}.$$

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Relatively prim	e numbers, $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$ , and $\phi(n)$			

Euler's totient function  $\phi(n)$ 

 $\phi(n)$  is the cardinality (number of elements) of  $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$ , i.e.,

 $\phi(n) = |\mathbf{Z}_n^*|.$ 

Example:  $\phi(21) = |\mathbf{Z}_{21}^*| = 12.$ 

Go back and count them!

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Relatively prime	e numbers, $\mathbf{Z}_n^*$ , and $\phi(n)$			

Properties of  $\phi(n)$ 

1. If p is prime, then

 $\phi(p)=p-1.$ 

2. More generally, if p is prime and  $k \ge 1$ , then

$$\phi(p^k) = p^k - p^{k-1} = (p-1)p^{k-1}$$

3. If gcd(m, n) = 1, then

 $\phi(mn) = \phi(m)\phi(n).$ 



# Example: $\phi(126)$

Can compute  $\phi(n)$  for all  $n \ge 1$  given the factorization of n.

$$\phi(126) = \phi(2) \cdot \phi(3^2) \cdot \phi(7)$$
  
=  $(2-1) \cdot (3-1)(3^{2-1}) \cdot (7-1)$   
=  $1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 6 = 36.$ 

The 36 elements of  $\mathbf{Z}_{126}^*$  are:

1, 5, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 25, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 55, 59, 61, 65, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 85, 89, 95, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 115, 121, 125.



# A formula for $\phi(n)$

Here is an explicit formula for  $\phi(n)$ .

#### Theorem

Write n in factored form, so  $n = p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_k^{e_k}$ , where  $p_1, \ldots, p_k$  are distinct primes and  $e_1, \ldots, e_k$  are positive integers.<sup>1</sup> Then

$$\phi(n) = (p_1 - 1) \cdot p_1^{e_1 - 1} \cdots (p_k - 1) \cdot p_k^{e_k - 1}.$$

Important: For the product of distinct primes p and q,

$$\phi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1).$$

<sup>1</sup>By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, every integer can be written uniquely in this way up to the ordering of the factors.

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# Discrete Logarithm

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#### Logarithms mod p

Let  $y = b^x$  over the reals. The ordinary base-*b* logarithm is the inverse of exponentiation, so  $x = \log_b(y)$ 

The discrete logarithm is defined similarly, but now arithmetic is performed in  $\mathbf{Z}_p^*$  for a prime *p*.

In particular, the base-*b* discrete logarithm of *y* modulo *p* is the least non-negative integer *x* such that  $y \equiv b^x \pmod{p}$  (if it exists). We write  $x = \log_b(y) \mod p$ .

Fact (not needed yet): If b is a primitive root<sup>2</sup> of p, then  $\log_b(y)$  is defined for every  $y \in \mathbf{Z}_p^*$ .

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>We will talk about primitive roots later.

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#### Discrete log problem

The *discrete log problem* is the problem of computing  $\log_b(y) \mod p$ , where p is a prime and b is a primitive root of p.

No efficient algorithm is known for this problem and it is believed to be intractable.

However, the inverse of the function  $\log_b() \mod p$  is the function power<sub>b</sub>(x) =  $b^x \mod p$ , which is easily computable.

power<sub>b</sub> is believed to be a *one-way function*, that is a function that is easy to compute but hard to invert.

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# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

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#### Key exchange problem

The *key exchange problem* is for Alice and Bob to agree on a common random key k.

One way for this to happen is for Alice to choose k at random and then communicate it to Bob over a secure channel.

But that presupposes the existence of a secure channel.

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#### D-H key exchange overview

The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol allows Alice and Bob to agree on a secret k without having prior secret information and without giving an eavesdropper Eve any information about k. The protocol is given on the next slide.

We assume that p and g are publicly known, where p is a large prime and g a primitive root of p.

From the fact on slide 28, these assumptions imply the existence of  $\log_g(y)$  for every  $y \in \mathbf{Z}_p^*$ .)

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#### D-H key exchange protocol

Alice	Bob
Choose random $x \in \mathbf{Z}_{\phi(p)}$ .	Choose random $y \in \mathbf{Z}_{\phi(p)}$ .
$a = g^{x} \mod p$ . Send <i>a</i> to Bob.	$b = g^{y} \mod p$ . Send <i>b</i> to Alice.
$k_a = b^{x} \mod p.$	$k_b = a^y \mod p.$

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol.

Clearly,  $k_a = k_b$  since

$$k_a \equiv b^x \equiv g^{xy} \equiv a^y \equiv k_b \pmod{p}.$$

Hence,  $k = k_a = k_b$  is a common key.

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# Why choose from $Z_{\phi(p)}$ ?

One might ask why x and y should be chosen from  $Z_{\phi(p)}$  rather than from  $Z_p$ ?

The reason is because of another number-theoretic fact that we haven't talked about – Euler's theorem – which says

$$g^{\phi(p)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}.$$

It follows that if  $x \equiv y \pmod{\phi(p)}$ , then  $g^x \equiv g^y \pmod{p}$ .

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#### Security of DH key exchange

In practice, Alice and Bob may use this protocol to generate a session key for a symmetric cryptosystem, which they subsequently use to exchange private information.

The security of this protocol relies on Eve's presumed inability to compute k from a and b and the public information p and g. This is sometime called the *Diffie-Hellman problem* and, like discrete log, is believed to be intractable.

Certainly the Diffie-Hellman problem is no harder that discrete log, for if Eve could find the discrete log of a, then she would know x and could compute  $k_a$  the same way that Alice does.

However, it is not known to be as hard as discrete log.