Privacy Issues in Linkedin



CPSC 457/557 - Sensitive Information October 7th, 2013 Haotian Xu

Outline

- Linkedin statistics and status quo
- Link Reconstruction Attack
- Find hidden connections on Linkedin
 - Algorithm and my experiment
- Cases
 - 2012 Linkedin iOS app collects private info
 - 2013 Linkedin "Intro" iOS mail app extension
- Thoughts & Conclusion

Linkedin: Statistics & Status Quo [1][2]

Statistics

- Members from 4500 to 259M in 10 years
- 39% users pay for the premium service
- 35% users access the site daily
- 42% users update their pages regularly
- 2.7 million of business pages
- 81% users belong to at least one group

Implications

- Big impact, 1% means two and half million users
- Business information and more attractive to hackers
- Higher privacy expectations from premium users

- One's personal information can be inferred from one's links
- Apply supervised learning algorithms to solve link prediction problem
 - Introduced to SNS by Liben and Kleinberg in 2003
- Michael Fire's paper: based on a classifier trained on a small set of easy-to-compute topological features
 - Quantitative analysis on nodes and connections
 - Feature extraction

Formally

- G=<V,E>, set of edges and vertices
- Edge: $e = (u,v) \in E$ where $u,v \in V$
- Training Set: <E>training Positive & Negative
- Classifiers: compute the likelihood of (u,v)
 ∈E or (u,v) ∉E for every two nodes u,v ∈ V

Feature Extraction


- Vertex degree
 - $\Gamma(v) := \{u | (u,v) \in E \text{ or } (v,u) \in E\}, \text{ degree}(v) := |\Gamma(v)|$
- Common Friends
 - common-friends(u, v) := $|\Gamma(v) \cap \Gamma(u)|$, for u,v ∈ V
- Total Friends
 - total-friends(u, v) := $|\Gamma(u) \cup \Gamma(v)|$, for u,v $\subseteq V$
- Jaccard's coefficient
 - Jaccard's-coefficient(u,v) := $|\Gamma(u)\cap\Gamma(v)|$ / $|\Gamma(u)\cup\Gamma(v)|$
- Preferential-attachment-score
 - preferential-attachment-score(u,v) := |Γ (u)| · |Γ (v)|

- Shortest path
 - shortest-path(u,v) Dijkstra's, Heuristic A* ,etc
- Friends Measure

$$friends - measure(u,v) := \sum_{x \in \Gamma(u)} \sum_{y \in \Gamma(v)} \delta(x,y)$$

Where $\delta(x, y)$ is defined as:


$$\delta(x,y) := \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = y \text{ or } (x,y) \in E \text{ or } (y,x) \in E \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$



- Experiment in 2012
 - FB 410 nodes, 635 links, data from web crawler
 - Result has very high Truth Positive rate > 98%
 - Linkedin is comparable to Facebook (if not better)
 - Undirected Connection
 - More cluster distribution on company
 - More features extraction criterions current and previous companies, groups, employment period


Table 1.3 Hard Training Set - Classifiers' Highest Results					
Dataset	Classifier	Train set size	TP	F-Measure	AUC
Facebook	Rotation Forest	$1,\!270$	0.9835	0.9686	0.9981
Academia.edu	Rotation Forest	1,445	0.9127	0.9213	0.9756
Friends & Family	Rotation Forest	563	0.9537	0.9471	0.9831
Student's Cooperation	Rotation Forest	623	0.999	0.9883	0.9998

Linkedin's privacy setting




However....

- Jessica Staddon researcher from PARC
- Algorithm:
 - 1. Attacker A establishes connection w/ Target T
 - 2. From **T**'s profile extract attributes
 - 3. Put those attributes into Linkedin's search tool
 - 4. For every returned profile **V**, add into set **Ct** if **T** is a shared connection between **A** and **V**
 - 5. Return set Ct
- Problem
 - Linkedin limits query results to 100
 - Attacker's own network




Goal: Find Haotian's old colleagues (hidden)

Target's account (Haotian) search criterias:




Attacker's account (Ding Yi) search criterias:



All same except the degree of connections

Result: 57 vs 57 - 100% covered!

Haotian (target) Ding Yi (attacker)



Executive Director at UBS AG Hong Kong - Information Technology and Services ▶ 1 shared connection - Similar П Protessional, Investor and Fidessa Expert Hong Kong - Banking ▼1 shared connection - Similar Haotian Xu 1st Software Engineer Current: Vice President at Merrill Lynch Head of IT Japan at UBS Japan - Banking ▼1 shared connection · Similar Haotian Xu 1st Software Engineer Technical project manager focused on Equity Derivatives and Commodities systems Hong Kong · Investment Banking ▶ 1 shared connection - Similar Current: Vice President - Equity Derivatives Technology at Deutsche Bank VP - Prime Finance Technology, Asia Pacific at Deutsche Bank Hong Kong Investment Banking 1 shared connection - Similar

- Tradeoff between the privacy protection and the utility
- Solution
 - Limit ith degree search
 - Fuzzy name only available to trustworthy users
 - O Discussion Other Ideas?

Linkedin iOS app case [5][6]

- Calendar viewing feature: opt-in
- Once enabled
 - Every calendar entry for the next 5 days
 - Meeting's title, organizer, attendees, time, notes
 - Both personal calendar entries and ones that may be for work
 - Information is being sent in plain text
- Dialog does NOT explicitly inform users about what information is being sent

Linkedin iOS app case


Amit & Sharabani from Skycure security

```
Pelephone 🛜 4:18 PM
                   {"calendar":{"calendarOptIn":true,"values":[{"e
     Event Details
                   vents":[{"organizer":{"name":"Adi Sharabani","e
Confidential: Internal
                   mail": "adi@skycure.com"}, "id": "635D0B49-1A84-44
financial results
Friday, Jun 1, 2012
                   5E-9FCD-00F975468B90:03E3338028A54FC0945BA33119
from 4 PM to 5 PM
                   Invitees
Yair Amit
                   :"AT&T conference call.\n USA:1-800-225-5288\n
Alert
                   Passcode: 4218000#", "endDate": "1338559200000", "s
30 minutes before
                   tartDate":"1338555600000","attendees":[{"name":
Availability
Busy
                    Yair Amit", "email": "yair@skycure.com"}], "title
Notes
AT&T conference call:
                    : "Confidential: Internal financial results" |
USA: 1-800-225-5288
Passcode: 4218000#
                     "timestamp":"1338498000000"}]}}
```


Linkedin's Response: "It's a great feature!"

"Intro" iOS mail plugin case [7][8]


- An extension of iOS Mail Client top bar
- CSS Tricks on hover: pseudo class
 - Cascading Style Sheets defines look and formatting for a document



"Intro" iOS mail plugin case



"Intro" iOS mail plugin case



"Intro" iOS mail plugin case

- Linkedin has access to plain text email
- Attorney-client privilege may be waived
- <iframe> is bad, possible clickjacking
- Changing device's security profile
- Possible violation of company's security policy
- Linkedin's Response Intro has 'the most secure implementation we believed possible'

Thoughts and Conclusion

- Not only Linkedin but also other SNS
- It's not what they say, but what they don't say on the privacy policy
- Linkedin's social responsibility: should not facilitate identity theft, spam, stalking etc
- However...
 - Users voluntarily joined the network (or even pay for it) in exchange for the services
 - User accepted the agreement and terms
 - If it is truly sensitive, user should not put it onto SNS in the first place

Reference

- 1. http://press.linkedin.com/about
- 2. http://visual.ly/10-amazing-linkedin-statistics-2013
- 3. [Link Prediction in Social Networks using Computationally Efficient Topological Features] by Michael Fire
- Staddon, J. Finding "hidden" connections on LinkedIn, an argument for more pragmatic social network privacy. Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Security and Artificial Intelligence (AISec 2009); 2009 November 9; Chicago, IL. NY: ACM; 2009; 11-14.
- 5. http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/06/06/linkedins-ios-app-collects-and-sends-names-emails-and-meeting-notes-from-your-calendar-back-in-plain-text
- 6. http://thenextweb.com/insider/2012/06/06/linkedin-updates-ios-app-following-data-transmission-concerns-but-insists-its-a-great-feature/
- 7. http://www.bishopfox.com/blog/2013/10/linkedin-intro/
- 8. http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/27/5034276/linkedin-says-intro-has-most-secure-implementation-possible
- 9. https://intro.linkedin.com/micro/privacy