Message-ID: <8208280.1075843185849.JavaMail.evans@thyme> Date: Wed, 30 Aug 2000 11:32:00 -0700 (PDT) From: jeff.dasovich@enron.com To: paul.kaufman@enron.com Subject: Re: Comments on Wholesale Issues Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-From: Jeff Dasovich X-To: Paul Kaufman X-cc: X-bcc: X-Folder: \Jeff_Dasovich_Dec2000\Notes Folders\Sent X-Origin: DASOVICH-J X-FileName: jdasovic.nsf Howdy: Just between thee and me, I think this note gets to some of the challenges we faced and discussed as part of our "group gropes" over the last several months. With Sue coming back on Tuesday, and in the spirt of our gropes, it might be useful to discuss as a group prior to charging ahead. May even result in the same outcome on how to proceed, but a little "process" on the front end may go a long way toward keeping things on an even keel. Anywho, just my two cents. Hope your meetings in Salem went well. Best, Jeff Mona L Petrochko 08/30/2000 05:51 PM To: James D Steffes/HOU/EES@EES, Harry Kingerski/HOU/EES@EES, West GA, Mary Hain@Enron, Richard Shapiro/HOU/EES@EES, Karen Denne@Enron, Peggy Mahoney/HOU/EES@EES, Mark Palmer/Corp/Enron@ENRON cc: Subject: Comments on Wholesale Issues Wood, the Assigned Commissioner in the investigation of wholesale electric markets, has asked for comments on the following questions by Friday, September 8. We are an individual party to the case as well as a member of ARM and WPTF. This would be a good opportunity to get our version of what is wrong on the record. The presentation that Tim and Mary put together for FERC will be helpful in answering these questions. I will take a first cut at drafting response to be circulated by Tuesday of next week. We can take liberties in providing responses that go beyond the question asked. Market Structure: Are the market conditions currently being experienced (price spikes and suppy shortages) inevitable under the current market structure? Do generators and/or scheduling coordinators have market power? Is there a need to mitigate such market power? Which market participants or other entities are responsible for reliability planning? Do California regulatory agencies have adequate jurisdiction to ensure reasonable prices and reliable service? Do the structures and governance of the Cal ISO and PX adequately support the goals of providing reasonably priced and reliable service? Market Rules: Are there rules which allow or encourage unacceptable market outcomes? What roles, if any, do underscheduling in forward markets, out of state transfers, uniform PX auction prices and ISO real-time and out-of-market purchases play in the outcomes being experienced? Behavior of Market Participants: What is working and not working in terms of price, reliability, information exchange, resource distribution, equity, service quality, and types of planned generation?