Message-ID: <2675781.1075851017680.JavaMail.evans@thyme> Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2001 05:52:00 -0800 (PST) From: james.steffes@enron.com To: david.delainey@enron.com, jeff.dasovich@enron.com, richard.shapiro@enron.com, steven.kean@enron.com, susan.mara@enron.com, alan.comnes@enron.com, mary.hain@enron.com, mark.palmer@enron.com, harry.kingerski@enron.com, tim.belden@enron.com, kevin.presto@enron.com, janet.dietrich@enron.com, christopher.calger@enron.com, christi.nicolay@enron.com, jeff.brown@enron.com, ron.mcnamara@enron.com, rob.bradley@enron.com, margaret.carson@enron.com, tammy.shepperd@enron.com, don.black@enron.com Subject: Comparison of PA vs CA Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-From: James D Steffes X-To: David W Delainey, Jeff Dasovich, Richard Shapiro, Steven J Kean, Susan J Mara, Alan Comnes, Mary Hain, Mark Palmer, Harry Kingerski, Tim Belden, Kevin M Presto, Janet R Dietrich, Christopher F Calger, Christi L Nicolay, Jeff Brown, Ron McNamara, Rob Bradley, Margaret Carson, Tammy R Shepperd, Don Black X-cc: X-bcc: X-Folder: \Steven_Kean_Oct2001_2\Notes Folders\Attachments X-Origin: KEAN-S X-FileName: skean.nsf Here is a pretty good comparison of the PA vs. CA markets - and why PA is n= ot=20 having the same problems. Some of the policy recommendations for moving=20 forward are "self-serving" (ie, 1000 MW of wind generation - the author is = a=20 wind advocate). Jim ----- Forwarded by James D Steffes/NA/Enron on 01/18/2001 01:40 PM ----- =09"PennFuture" =0901/18/2001 01:12 PM =09Please respond to "PennFuture" =09=09=20 =09=09 To: =09=09 cc:=20 =09=09 Subject: PennFuture's E-cubed - Survivor: Electric Competition PennFuture's E-cubed is a commentary biweekly email publication concerning= =20 the current themes and trends in the energy market.=20 ? January 18, 2001 Vol. 3, No. 2 ? Survivor: Electric Competition ? With rolling blackouts plunging the Golden State into darkness, California = =20 has reached the point of being voted off the electricity policy island. Wil= l =20 other states soon follow California=01,s footprints in the sand to a collap= sed =20 electricity system? And how does Pennsylvania=01,s approach to surviving = =20 electricity restructuring compare to California=01,s? ? In electricity policy, California and Pennsylvania have one thing in common= =20 =01* in 1996 they both passed state statutes that were advertised as the me= ans=20 of ending electricity generation retail monopolies (and reducing electrici= ty=20 prices for consumers). Yet, that=01,s where the similarity ends.=20 ? Pennsylvania believes that the electricity market cannot be competitive, = =20 unless both the wholesale and retail electricity segments of the market are= =20 competitive. The supply of electricity is largely a function of the=20 wholesale market, and demand a function of the retail market. For the=20 electricity market to be optimally efficient, supply and demand must respo= nd=20 to competitive price signals by the end of the transition period.=20 Consequently, Pennsylvania has focused on retail market structure and push= es=20 for competitive wholesale market policies like the expansion of the=20 wholesale market known as PJM.=20 ? On the other hand, retail competition was always the sizzle but never the = =20 steak in California policy-making. Now being scrapped and replaced by=20 something that will again raid consumers=01, wallets, California=01,s appr= oach=20 assumed that a successful result would occur if competition were introduce= d=20 only into the wholesale market, as long as utilities passed this price=20 through to their still captive retail customers. In that assumption =01* p= lus=20 the desire to pay its utilities $30 billion of stranded costs on an=20 accelerated schedule =01* lies the root of California=01,s disaster. Explo= ding=20 demand and the failure of the federal government to end the balkanization = of=20 the nation=01,s wholesale electric markets have also played a role in=20 aggravating the outcome but have not caused it, as is proven by the=20 continued successful operation of California=01,s generation-owning munici= pal=20 utilities. ? Although the chosen paths of Pennsylvania and California have landed them = in=20 very different places on the road to surviving and succeeding in electric = =20 competition, the game=01,s not over and Pennsylvania still faces challenges= =20 ahead. But with the exception of GPU that now suffers from unwise or unluc= ky=20 decisions, Pennsylvania consumers and utilities are not only surviving but= =20 also benefiting from electric competition. ? How=01,s Pennsylvania Doing? To date, Pennsylvania=01,s consumers have saved $2.84 billion since Januar= y 1,=20 1997, and 568,000 consumers have switched to a competitive supplier. That= =20 total will surpass 900,000 by April as a result of the recent successful= =20 auction of competitive default supply in the PECO Energy service territory= ,=20 which will enable New Power to serve another 300,000 customers and Green= =20 Mountain an additional 50,000. This auction wouldn=01,t have succeeded wit= hout=20 the commitment of PECO Energy and without the high residential shopping=20 credit of 5.65 cents per kilowatt-hour. Licensed competitors now supply=20 about 25% of the electricity consumed by Pennsylvania=01,s families and=20 businesses. ? So far, by switching many shopping customers have saved 5% to 15% off their= =20 total electric bills and have been able to contract for electricity for a= =20 year or longer. Competitive retail offers are well below =01* typically 0.= 9 to=20 3.15 cents per kilowatt-hours =01* what residential consumers were paying= =20 utilities for generation prior to competition, or the utilities=01, embedd= ed=20 generation rate. In addition, most shopping and non-shopping customers hav= e=20 enjoyed guaranteed total rate cuts of 2% to 8%, and rates for customers of= =20 Duquesne Light will be slashed by about 20% in 2002.=20 ? Renewable and cleaner energy products are available for the first time in = =20 the state=01,s history, and 80,000 customers have purchased them. The first= two =20 wind farms in Pennsylvania are operational and several more are likely to b= e =20 built in 2001. The Commonwealth can realistically act to attract 1,000=20 megawatts of additional new wind generation by 2010.=20 ? The budgets for Pennsylvania=01,s substantial Low-Income Usage Reduction = =20 Program and for its national leading Customer Assistance Programs, which=20 reduce rates by as much as 50% for low-income families, have been=20 quadrupled. In fact, approximately 80,000 low-income families in the PECO= =20 Energy service territory alone have received these sharply lower rates.=20 ? Beyond this impressive record of accomplishment, rates are capped at Janua= ry=20 1, 1997 levels until at least 2005 and at slightly higher levels until 201= 0=20 in most service territories. The jump in natural gas and oil home heating = =20 bills by as much as 50% this winter underscores the tremendous value of the= =20 rate cap to consumers. Unlike those energy sources, the retail price of=20 electricity hasn=01,t increased at all. Indeed, the electric rate cap alon= e has=20 probably saved electricity consumers hundreds of millions of dollars just = in=20 the last year and made electricity the only energy bargain in this winter = of=20 gas and oil price spikes. ? The Pennsylvania and California Experience: As Different as Richard and Ru= dy=20 Pennsylvania embarked on its competitive retail journey by running a large= =20 pilot program from November 1997 through December 1998, as required by the= =20 state electric competition statute. In the pilot, over 220,000 customers = =01*=20 5% of the entire state=01,s load =01* switched to a competitive supplier. = The=20 total number of customers that switched in California almost never exceede= d=20 the number that did so just during Pennsylvania=01,s pilot program.=20 ? The pilot revealed that consumers want to shop for electricity, as more th= an=20 900,000 customers asked for permission to shop, and would do so if stranded= =20 costs were not paid to utilities in a manner that destroyed the retail =20 competitive market. Just as importantly, the large pilot project proved tha= t =20 many companies would enter the retail market to serve all customer classes= =20 as long as stranded cost recovery mechanisms didn=01,t make entry impossib= le.=20 ? Of course, whether stranded cost recovery mechanisms kill retail competiti= on=20 depends on the size of what is variously called the shopping credit, the= =20 price to compare, or the default rate. These are terms for the amount in = =20 cents per kilowatt-hour that a switching customer no longer pays for=20 generation service to the local utility once the customer takes his busine= ss=20 to a competitor.=20 ? California set this amount at absurdly low levels and linked it to the =20 wholesale price. By doing so, California killed retail competition and=20 delivered San Diego=01,s customers into the tender mercies of the local=20 utility, a deregulated monopoly that offered a 100% spot market electricit= y=20 product.=20 ? By contrast, Pennsylvania recognized that, in a truly free market a shoppi= ng=20 customer should not pay anything to the utility for electricity no longer= =20 purchased. Pennsylvania also recognized that its decision to allow utiliti= es=20 to recover 100% of their documented stranded costs required consumers to= =20 continue to pay some amount for some transition period for the electricity = =20 they were no longer buying from the utility. Pennsylvania responded by tryi= ng=20 to make sure that the amount of stranded cost recovery did not eviscerate= =20 the consumers=01, shopping credit. Pennsylvania understood that what was l= eft=20 of the consumers=01, shopping credit after stranded cost payments were=20 considered had to be sufficiently greater than the prices they would see i= n=20 the market so that they could save money by shopping =01* and so that=20 competitive suppliers would enter the market to serve them.=20 ? Pennsylvania shopping credits are typically 50% to 100% higher than those = in=20 California, but still well below every utility=01,s embedded generation rat= e. =20 Retail competition has worked best for consumers in those parts of=20 Pennsylvania where the shopping credits are highest. In those service=20 territories, principally Duquesne Light and PECO Energy, huge numbers of= =20 residential and other customers have switched suppliers and realized savin= gs=20 and/or purchased cleaner energy products.=20 ? Lessons Learned The lesson is clear: retail competition won=01,t work unless shopping cred= its=20 are set as close as possible to a utility=01,s embedded generation rate, g= iven=20 the amount of stranded cost recovery allowed. For retail competition to be= =20 genuine, the shopping credit must equal the utility=01,s embedded generati= on=20 rate if no stranded costs are recovered, or once recovery is complete.=20 ? Yet, protecting consumers=01, shopping credits is not the only necessary = =20 condition for a competitive market. Other conditions that must be met are a= =20 liquid, workably competitive wholesale market that includes future contract= s=20 as well as spot price trading, and the empowerment of customers through=20 time-of-use meters and appliance control technologies to change their dema= nd=20 and profit from doing so. ? Other Differences From its pilot experience, a unique Pennsylvania restructuring model emerg= ed=20 that has five major differences from California=01,s policies, in addition= to=20 the shopping credit: length of transition periods, divestiture of generati= on=20 assets, reliance on spot markets and requirements to sell and buy from spo= t=20 markets, size and administration of wholesale markets, and entry of new=20 supply. ? Transition Pennsylvania=01,s transition periods are longer, running from at least eig= ht to=20 as many as 14 years (1997 to 2010). This longer transition period gives ti= me=20 to correct infirmities in the nation=01,s wholesale markets, reduces the p= er=20 kilowatt-hour stranded cost charge and price distortion by spreading=20 stranded costs over more years, and time to create a true demand-side=20 response that can police the wholesale market.=20 ? Divestiture and spot markets Pennsylvania allowed but didn=01,t require utilities to divest generation= =20 assets, and two have done so. Pennsylvania didn=01,t require utilities to = sell=20 all power into and buy all power from a newly created wholesale spot marke= t.=20 Pennsylvania utilities are free to use long-term contracts and any hedging= =20 instruments that they deem appropriate. The combination of these policies= =20 have made utilities and their customers less dependent upon the volatile= =20 spot market than those in California.=20 ? Size and administration of markets Prior to 1996, two-thirds of Pennsylvania was part of the largest=20 electricity free trade zone in America =01* the 58,000 megawatt wholesale= =20 market governed by the PJM independent system operator, which stretches fr= om=20 Virginia to Northern New Jersey and includes Maryland, Delaware, NJ, and= =20 Washington DC. Unlike the California ISO and Power Exchange (PX) that were= =20 rushed into operation in 1998, PJM was founded in 1927 and has been steadi= ly=20 transformed from an entity that once served only member utilities into a= =20 separate corporation with a board that is completely independent of market= =20 participants. The PJM board has the legal duty of ensuring that the=20 wholesale market is genuinely competitive and reliable.=20 ? Moreover, unlike the California ISO and PX that serves only portions of =20 California, PJM is a multi-state, regional market. It also borders the New= =20 York Independent System Operator and is near to the New England System=20 Operator. PJM, NYISO, and New England ISO benefit from their close proximi= ty=20 and a common wholesale market price cap. In fact, independent system=20 operators administer wholesale markets all the way from Maine to Northern= =20 Virginia. Nowhere else in America over such a large, connected geographic= =20 area are the trading rules and operations of the power grid no longer=20 controlled directly by local electric monopolies.=20 ? New supply About 600 megawatts of new supply were added to PJM=01,s wholesale market = in=20 2000; 3,000 megawatts will be added in 2001; and 5,000 megawatts in 2002,= =20 according to PJM officials. This substantial amount of new supply should= =20 preserve reliability and prevent shortages. ? Staying On Track Although Pennsylvania has a successful four years of transition to=20 generation competition behind it, and has delivered many benefits, the=20 process could still go off track. To avoid pitfalls, five things must occu= r. ? First, PJM must be expanded to the service territories of Allegheny Energy= =20 and Duquesne Light, and, in fact, negotiations are underway for these two= =20 utilities to create PJM-West. FirstEnergy must also be required to join PJ= M=20 as a condition of its merger with GPU. Additionally, within five years onl= y=20 one Independent System Operator should operate from Northern Virginia to= =20 Maine. It=01,s time to seriously think about one of those famous =01&merge= rs of=20 equals=018 for the three independent system operators on the East Coast.= =20 Expansion of PJM will create a bigger wholesale market, and a bigger marke= t=20 should be more competitive, transparent, and stable. ? Second, customers must be given the ability to change their demand in =20 response to price in real times. As a result, customers must have=20 time-of-use meters and control devices installed on appliances like air=20 conditioners and water heaters. Utilities should be required to install th= is=20 equipment over the next five to 10 years. Only with this equipment can=20 customers gain financial incentives for changing demand. Ensuring that=20 demand responds more directly to price is critical to limiting wholesale= =20 market prices, to preserving reliability, and to reducing environmental an= d=20 public health problems caused by the production and consumption of=20 electricity. PJM calculates that a 1% reduction in peak demand causes a 10= %=20 reduction in peak price.=20 ? In addition, energy efficiency should be pursued before a crisis hits. =20 Available consumer education money should be used to increase the market = =20 penetration of fluorescent light bulbs, programmable thermostats, and other= =20 energy-saving devices. ? Third, Pennsylvania should monitor additions to supply and attract at least= =20 1,000 megawatts of new wind generation. ? Fourth, the budget for the Office of Consumer Advocate (OCA) should be =20 substantially increased to allow it to monitor and research the operation o= f=20 the wholesale market, in order to guard against abusive market power. OCA= =20 must have the ability to know as much as market participants about outage= =20 rates, withholding of power, imports, exports, and so on. A beefed up OCA= =20 would be the best deterrent to some business practices that ultimately wou= ld=20 destroy public confidence in competitive markets. ? Fifth, distributed generation is a potentially powerful competitor to grid = =20 power. The Commonwealth needs to ensure that any barriers to entry for=20 modern, clean, distributed generation technologies are removed. A uniform= =20 statewide law that addresses issues such as installation standards, net=20 metering rules, and interconnection policies in a manner that will promote= =20 distributed generation should be enacted. ? Together these five policies can help Pennsylvania successfully complete t= he=20 journey to surviving and succeeding in electricity competition. Yet, the = =20 failure to enact these policies could put at risk all that has been achieve= d.=20 A successful completion of this transition is vital to our future, as both= =20 the benefits achieved so far in Pennsylvania and the ongoing trouble in=20 California make clear.=20 ? In Pennsylvania, more consumer, business, and environmental benefits are n= ot=20 guaranteed but are in reach. With continuing attention to detail, =20 electricity in Pennsylvania by 2010 can be cheaper, cleaner, and a source o= f =20 competitive advantage. ? For other states entering or contemplating electric competition, both =20 California and Pennsylvania offer important lessons on how to stay in the= =20 game and win. =20 E-cubed is available for reprint in newspapers and other publications. =20 Authors are available for print or broadcast. Support E-cubed by becoming a= =20 member of PennFuture =01* visit our secure online membership page at=20 www.pennfuture.org by clicking on =01&Support Our Work.=018 ? PennFuture, with offices in Harrisburg, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, is a= =20 statewide public interest membership organization, which advances policies= =20 to protect and improve the state=01,s environment and economy. PennFuture= =01,s=20 activities include litigating cases before regulatory bodies and in local,= =20 state and federal courts, advocating and advancing legislative action on a= =20 state and federal level, public education and assisting citizens in public = =20 advocacy.? - Vol3No2_11701.doc