Message-ID: <17571231.1075846344762.JavaMail.evans@thyme> Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2000 06:25:00 -0700 (PDT) From: linda.lawrence@enron.com To: vibeke.laroi@reuters.com Subject: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-From: Linda L Lawrence X-To: Vibeke.Laroi@reuters.com X-cc: X-bcc: X-Folder: \Steven_Kean_Dec2000_1\Notes Folders\Ferc X-Origin: KEAN-S X-FileName: skean.nsf Per Mr. Steven Kean, of Enron Corp. please see below ( Appendix C - Order 8= 88=20 "Allegations of Public Utilities Exercising Transmission Dominance).=20 APPENDIX C Allegations of Public Utilities Exercising Transmission Dominance I. Examples From Proceedings Before Administrative Law Judges These are examples of allegations that various public utilities have refused to provide comparable service, either through refusals to wheel, dilatory tactics that so protracted negotiations as to effectively deny wheeling, refusals to provide service priority equal to native load, or refusals to provide service flexibility equivalent to the utility's own use. A. American Electric Power Service Corp. (AEP) In 1993, AEP filed, on behalf of its public utility associate companies, an open access tariff that offered only firm point-to-point service with very limited flexibility. It did not offer network service, flexible point-to-point service, or non- firm service. Thus, it did not provide customers with the same flexibility that AEP itself has. Nor did it provide a service priority equivalent to that enjoyed by native load. The Commission set AEP's tariff for hearing and, on rehearing, held that in order not to be unduly discriminatory, the tariff had to offer comparable service. American Electric Power Service Corp., 64 FERC =0F4 61,279 (1993), reh'g, 67 FERC =0F4 61,168 (1994). = =20 At hearing, Raj Rao of Indiana Michigan Power Agency (IMPA) (Ex. IMPA-1, Feb 23, 1994) and Kenneth Hegemann of American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc. (AMP-Ohio) (Ex. AMPO-1, Feb 23, 1994), both senior management officials, testified concerning AEP's =0F, - 2 - alleged discriminatory practices. 1/ AMP-Ohio is an association of municipalities in Ohio, some of whose members depend on AEP for transmission and partial requirements service.= =20 IMPA is an association of municipalities in Indiana, and many of IMPA's loads are captive to the AEP transmission system. The witnesses alleged as follows:=20 1. In anticipation of high peak demands, AEP would contract for large blocks of available short-term power, withhold sale of short-term power, refuse to transmit third party short-term power, and require purchases from AEP at the emergency rate (100 mill/kwh) when an emergency might not exist. Ex. AMPO-1 at 6. 2. In December 1989, AMP-Ohio negotiated a 20 MW purchase of short-term power from Louisville Gas & Electric Company (LG&E). AEP refused to wheel because LG&E had earlier that day told AEP it had no power to sell to AEP.=20 AEP then bought the power from LG&E and offered to resell it to AMP-Ohio. Ex. AMPO-1 at 6-7. 3. In January 1990, AMP-Ohio solicited bids for February power purchases from a number of utilities including AEP. AEP was not the winning bid. AMP-Ohio made arrangements to purchase the power from four winning bidders and sought transmission through AEP. When AMP-Ohio gave AEP =20 1/ After the Rehearing Order expanding the scope of the proceeding, AMP-Ohio and IMPA withdrew this testimony as no longer necessary. This withdrawal does not change the fact that the testimony was sworn to under oath. =0F, - 3 - the schedule for delivery, AEP refused to transmit the power, matched the average price of the winning bids, and made the sale itself. Ex. AMPO-1 at 7. 4. In August 1993, an AMP-Ohio member (Columbus, Ohio) was purchasing 10 MW of hourly non-displacement power from AEP and, after AEP raised its price to 60 mills/kwh, sought another source for the next hour. Consumers Power Company and Detroit Edison Company both offered non-displacement power at 40 mills. AEP refused to transmit, saying it had a 600 MW unit out and could not resell power from another source. 2/ Columbus cancelled the transaction and had to buy 10 MW of power from AEP at 100 mills/kwh. Ex. AMPO-1 at 7-8. 5. In July 1993, two AMP-Ohio members (Columbus and St. Mary's) had been buying hourly non-displacement power from AEP when the price rose to 35 mills. Dayton Power & Light Company (DP&L) offered to sell at 23 mills and AEP agreed to transmit for one hour. But for the next hour, AEP said it had problems with its system, refused to transmit the power, kept the power from DP&L for itself and offered to sell power to AMP-Ohio for Columbus and St. Mary's at 100 =20 2/ AEP generally limited its offer of short-term transmission to buy/sell transactions; that is, AEP would buy the power from the seller and resell it to the purchaser.=20 Supplemental testimony of AEP Witness Baker (Ex. A-73) at 27-29. Often, the terms of the buy/sell transaction required transmission dependent utilities (TDUs) to maintain reserves and meet contractual commitments for at least a year. Id. =20 =0F, - 4 - mills. Columbus increased its local generation, but St. Mary's purchased 8 MW at 100 mills. For the next hour, AMP- Ohio arranged with DP&L for another 8 MW, hoping AEP would transmit under the 24 hour buy-sell agreement. AEP did transmit this power. Seven hours later in the day, St. Mary's Greenup Hydro project power was available and the 8 MW from DP&L was no longer needed. If St. Mary's had been receiving the hourly power that AEP had refused to transmit, St. Mary's could have switched to Greenup power. But because AMP-Ohio had changed to daily service, St. Mary's had to pay a demand charge for the entire day, even though it used the power only 7 hours and would have paid less under the hourly rate. Ex. AMPO-1 at 8-9.=20 6. In January 1994, AMP-Ohio sought to transfer power from one member with generation to other members, which required transmission over AEP and Toledo Edison lines.=20 Toledo Edison said yes, AEP said no. AMP-Ohio's northern members purchased emergency power from Toledo Edison. AMP- Ohio then reminded AEP that it had agreed not to deny transmission and AEP agreed to transmit. Ex. AMPO-1 at 9. = =20 7. IMPA arranged to buy 80 MW of short-term power from LG&E and have it wheeled, using buy-sell arrangements, through Public Service Company of Indiana (PSI) and AEP to serve IMPA's load at Richmond (an IMPA member). The delivered price was $.292 per kW-day plus a 1 mill adder.=20 At the same time AEP arranged to buy 300 MW from PSI at $.30 =0F, - 5 - per kW day plus out-of-pocket energy costs. Hence, PSI was shipping a total of 380 MW to AEP with 80 MW of that amount to be delivered to IMPA's load at Richmond. Then, on a day when IMPA should have received the 80 MW, AEP told IMPA that PSI had sold everything to AEP and that IMPA would have to buy from AEP at $.63 per kW day plus the cost of energy from AEP. IMPA purchased from AEP under protest. AEP used its control over transmission to intercept the 80 MW at a lower price and resell it as short-term power to IMPA. AEP claimed that PSI had terminated its sales to AEP on that day. But the 80 MW was independent of PSI's other sales to AEP and would not have been interrupted if AEP had not interrupted it. IMPA-1 at 7. 8. IMPA has combustion turbines owned by and located at one member, which IMPA would like to connect to the Joint Transmission System owned by IMPA, CINergy and Wabash Valley Power Association. To do so, IMPA needed a metering agreement with AEP, to which AEP would not agree. IMPA-1 at 6. 9. In January 1994, IMPA had power to sell from its turbines when AEP and others needed power. IMPA offered power to AEP but AEP it said could not purchase the power without an existing contract. Moreover, since there was no short-term tariff, IMPA could not sell the power to another utility. IMPA-1 at 6. =20 10. Another example of the utility engaging in =0F, - 6 - dilatory tactics that raised the customer's transaction costs and effectively denied transmission is the "sham transaction" provision proposed by AEP. As filed, AEP's tariffs permitted it to deny service merely because a portion of the transmitted power might be used to serve a former retail customer of AEP. See, e.g., Ex. BR&WVP-1 (J. Bertram Solomon testimony, February 23, 1994). (As part of a settlement AEP filed the pro forma tariff and withdrew this provision.)=20 11. Finally, AEP's originally filed tariff contained a "prodigal customer" provision. Under this provision, transmission customers who sought to convert back to requirements service had to give AEP five years' notice, in which case AEP and the customer would enter into negotiations to determine whether AEP will provide service at all and if so under what rate, terms, and conditions.=20 Ex. S-39 at 1 (Staff testimony). AEP did not require notice from all new customers, only from prodigal customers. Id. at 2. That a potential customer was previously served by AEP is not a reason to treat the customer differently. (AEP withdrew this provision when it filed the pro forma tariff.) B. Entergy Services, Inc. (Entergy)=20 Entergy filed a partial settlement largely adopting the NOPR pro forma tariffs except for two provisions (headroom and ancillary services). Because the settlement predated the filing date for customer testimony before the ALJ, the customers did not =0F, - 7 - address the need for Entergy to file a tariff. However, customers did make allegations of discriminatory practices, as follows. =20 1. Customers alleged that Entergy flat-out refused to wheel. Louisiana Energy and Power Authority (LEPA) witness Sylvan J. Richard testified that LEPA's predecessor systems could not obtain interconnections from Entergy. Ex. SJR-1 at 50. 2. Customers also alleged that Entergy refused to provide service priority equal to native load and refused to provide service flexibility equivalent to the utility's own use. For example, LEPA witness Richard testified that even after state commissions ordered interconnections and other coordination services, LEPA's predecessors were still not able to obtain coordination services because Entergy was not willing to coordinate and because the transmission service it did offer was inflexible, unidirectional point-to-point service, which prevented economic coordination with others.= =20 Id. at 50-51. =20 3. South Mississippi Electric Power Association (SMEPA) witness J. Bertram Solomon testified that Entergy's original "open access" tariff was restricted to point-to- point service, proposed separate charges for each operating company, and required the cancellation of existing agreements in order to take service under the proposed tariff. Ex. SMEPA-10 at 28. Entergy eventually filed a =0F, - 8 - network tariff, but proposed different local facilities charges for the various Entergy public utility operating subsidiaries. Id. at 29. Since these local facilities charges were higher than the transmission component of the subsidiaries' bundled rates, Entergy obtained a competitive advantage. Id. 4. The Arkansas Cities and Cooperatives (ACC) is a group of cities and cooperatives that own or operate electric generation or distribution systems in Arkansas.=20 ACC Witness Steven Merchant testified that Entergy has segregated the wholesale market between two of its subsidiaries, Arkansas Power & Light Copmpany (APL) and Entergy Power, Inc. (EPI). Ex. SMM-1 at 16. In marketing power and energy in Arkansas, EPI is subject to an Arkansas Commission order that bars EPI from competing with APL for wholesale loads without first obtaining a waiver. Id.=20 Recently, EPI requested this waiver for all wholesale transactions in Arkansas except for wholesale customers currently served by an Entergy subsidiary; in other words, EPI requested the Arkansas Commission to expand competition for all wholesale customers except where EPI might compete with APL. Id. ACC witness Merchant concluded that, since EPI does not compete with APL, Entergy insulates APL's wholesale business from competition and denies those wholesale customers access to EPI as a source of power, thereby limiting alternative generation sources available to =0F, - 9 - ACC. Id. at 17-19. (Entergy's witness Kenney stated that Entergy has recently filed a joint motion with ACC to the Arkansas Commission seeking to extend the waiver and permit EPI to sell to APL's wholesale customers. Ex. JFK-11 at 14- 15.) C. Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E) Northern California Power Agency (NCPA) attached several documents to its 1988 complaint in Docket No. EL89-4. These documents were provided to support NCPA's claim that PG&E's unreasonable practices under the PG&E/NCPA Interconnection Agreement (IA) effectively denied NCPA access to transmission properly requested under the IA. Although the parties eventually settled and the Commission terminated the docket with a letter order dated May 18, 1988, these documents provide allegations of PG&E using dilatory tactics that so protracted negotiations as to effectively equal a refusal to wheel. 3/ =20 1. PG&E stated that since transmission was not currently available, it was entitled to wait 72 months before providing transmission; that is, transmission access could not be granted before the passing of the 72-month notice period. NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex. 3. However, the IA =20 3/ All of these incidents are related to and examples of PG&E's conduct described in the NOPR (FERC Stats. & Regs. =0F4 32,5= 14 at 33,073 n.151), that is, the history of PG&E's attempt to avoid its commitments made to the California owners of the California Oregon Transmission Project (COTP). However, these incidents are not exactly the same as the incidents described in the NOPR, because NCPA is not one of the owners of the COTP. =0F, - 10 - provided that transmission be provided when it becomes actually available. PG&E also requested substantial additional information, which NCPA considered beyond that reasonably necessary for a study, but still provided. PG&E then determined that transmission was not available, reasoning that transmission was unavailable unless all the transmission requested could be provided 8760 hours per year without restrictions or limitations, extending through the expiration of the agreement in 2013. NCPA 1988 Complaint at 9. =20 2. On November 27, 1987, NCPA made a new transmission request to PG&E, seeking 50 MW of bi-directional transmission at Midway. NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex. 5. On January 28, 1988, PG&E filed an interconnection agreement with Turlock Irrigation District (TID) that provided TID with 50 MW of bi-directional transmission at Midway.=20 Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 42 FERC =0F4 61,406, order o= n reh'g, 43 FERC =0F4 61,403 (1988). On February 22, 1988, PG= &E advised NCPA that all firm transmission service available at Midway had been fully subscribed. NCPA 1988 Complaint, Ex. 6. Then, on March 29, 1988, PG&E filed with the Commission an interconnection agreement with Modesto Irrigation District (MID), that provided MID with 50 MW of bi- directional transmission at Midway. Pacific Gas & Electric Company, 44 FERC =0F4 61,010 (1988). At about the same time (in the last week in March 1988), PG&E advised NCPA that the =0F, - 11 - allocations of transmission to TID, MID, and others, including a not yet finalized allocation to Sacramento Municipality Utility District, had used all the transmission available at Midway. NCPA 1988 Complaint, Exs. 7 and 8. = =20 D. Northeast Utilities Service Company (NU) This is the case where Northeast Utilities acquired Public Service of New Hampshire (PSNH) (Docket No. EC90-10). New England Power Company (NEP) witness Robert Bigelow's direct testimony expressed concern over the "relatively restrictive transmission policies of both" NU, on behalf of Northeast Utilities' public utility subsidiaries, and PSNH. Bigelow Direct Testimony at 21 (filed May 25, 1990). In his cross rebuttal testimony, Mr. Bigelow testified that "NU has a poor track record as a provider of transmission service" and "PSNH also has an abhorrent track record as a provider of transmission services."= =20 Bigelow Cross Rebuttal Testimony, at 3 (filed June 20, 1990).=20 Mr. Bigelow described both NU's and NEP's (his own company) failure to provide service flexibility equivalent to their own use. Except for NEP's TDUs, both NEP and NU historically provided only point-to-point transmission, which required separate scheduling for each transaction. Bigelow Cross Rebuttal at 4. E. Southern California Edison Company and San Diego Gas and Electric Company The evidence in this merger proceeding (Docket No. EC89-5) included testimony from a number of witnesses describing =0F, - 12 - instances of Edison's conduct. Richard Greenwalt was the power supply supervisor for the City of Riverside, California. He was responsible for scheduling all purchases of energy for Riverside and for the cities of Azusa, Banning and Colton, California.=20 Greenwalt testimony at 1 (November 1989). (These four cities and Anaheim, California, are collectively referred to as the Southern Cities or Cities.) Joseph Hsu was the Director of Utilities for Azusa. Hsu testimony at 1 (November 1989). Gale Drews was the electric utility director of Colton. Drews testimony at 1-2 (November 1989). Bill Carnahan was the director for Riverside.= =20 Carnahan testimony at 1 (November 1989). Gordon Hoyt was the general manager of the Anaheim power department. Hoyt testimony at 1 (November 1989). Dan McCann was the power coordination supervisor for Anaheim. He supervised Anaheim's load scheduling and is a former Edison employee, having worked for Edison for 20 years. McCann Testimony at 1-2 (November 1989). These witnesses testified that Edison refused to wheel as follows. 1. Edison's policy was to curtail the Cities any time it could be justified using any of a list of acceptable reasons to deny interruptible transmission service. Id. at 22-23.=20 2. Edison would not generally provide transmission service when Edison could save money by itself purchasing the economy energy that would be wheeled. McCann testimony at 19. The Cities called Edison every hour to request interruptible transmission service. Id.. Edison often =0F, - 13 - refused to sell energy available in the Western Systems Power Pool to the Cities and then made available higher cost contract energy or partial requirements service. Id. at 19- 20. =20 3. When Anaheim requested Edison provide firm transmission of power from neighboring states, Edison would often agree to provide non-firm service but would not integrate the capacity for many years in the future, saying that its control area did not need capacity at that time.=20 Hoyt testimony at 9. Since the selling utility was interested in a sale of capacity, not just energy, the transaction would not occur. Id. Edison repeatedly used its control over transmission to deny Anaheim access to low- cost firm power. Id. at 9-10. =20 4. While Edison provided short-term firm transmission service to the Cities, it would only provide long-term firm service for three specific resources: the SONGS nuclear plant, a specific IPP, and Hoover Dam power. Hoyt testimony at 20. One of Edison's reasons for denying long-term transmission was that Edison desired to reserve the transmission for its own future (unspecified) needs. Id. = =20 5. In the 1970s, Edison refused to allow the Cities access to the Pacific Intertie. Hoyt testimony at 21; Drews testimony at 7-8. =20 6. In 1988, Edison refused to provide transmission service for a Cities power purchase from Public Service =0F, - 14 - Company of New Mexico (PSNM) from Palo Verde Nuclear station. Hoyt testimony at 21. =20 7. Edison has refused to provide requested firm transmission from =20 - California-Oregon border to Midway Station - Nevada-Oregon Border to Sylmar Substation - Palo Verde Switchyard to Vista=20 - SONGS Switchyard to Vista. Carnahan testimony at 15. =20 8. Riverside requested transmission from Palo Verde and was told that such service was not available. Carnahan testimony at 16. Edison offered Riverside only 12 MW of curtailable transmission entitlement to provide Riverside's share of Palo Verde. Id. This service was neither large enough or long enough, and Edison insisted on unreasonable terms and conditions. Id. 9. Azusa, Banning and Colton had a contract with Edison that entitled them to use their Palo Verde firm transmission path to schedule energy to meet their contract energy obligation. Edison refused to permit the three cities to use that path. Edison did not contest that the contracts allowed this use, but said that the scheduling of such small amounts of energy for the three cities would be too burdensome. Greenwalt testimony at 14.=20 10. Edison would not respond in a timely manner to the Cities' requests, routinely taking months to respond. Drews =0F, - 15 - testimony at 15. 11. During the 1980s, Edison provided Colton with some transmission service to allow the Cities to reach certain suppliers, but limited the choices available to the Cities and imposed terms and conditions that increased the Cities' costs and placed Colton at a disadvantage against Edison.=20 Drews testimony at 9. Arranging alternative generation sources was difficult because the Cities always had to first get Edison to state whether it would provide transmission.= =20 12. During 1988 and 1989, a dispute arose between Edison and the Cities concerning the Hoover Uprating Project. Drews testimony at 16. Edison argued that for the months when units were out of service for uprating, and Southern Cities capacity was reduced to zero, Southern Cities would not receive an energy credit, even though energy was still available and used by Edison. But the contracts allowed a participant who did not have capacity to still schedule its energy as non-firm energy on the capacity of another participant. Id. at 16-17. 13. In 1986, Azusa negotiated a power purchase contract with the California Department of Water Resources in increments of first 5 MW and then 2 MW (for a total of 7 MW). Hsu testimony at 14. First Edison assured Azusa that the transmission for the additional 2 MW would not be a problem. Id. Then Edison would not agree to amend the transmission service agreement for the additional 2 MW. Id. =0F, - 16 - 14. In 1986, Azusa notified Edison of Special Condition 12 4/ purchases from PG&E and requested firm transmission service. Id. Two months before service was to begin, Edison notified the Cities of a problem with the transmission lines. Id. Transmission was eventually granted, but only after a four-month delay and substantial losses to the Cities. Id. Then Edison decided there was no problem with its transmission facilities. Id. at 14-15. 15. In 1986-87, the Cities purchased 20 MW from PG&E and 80 MW from Deseret G&T Cooperative. Hoyt testimony at 7-8. Edison stated that without reinforcement of its transmission system, Edison would not provide the transmission. Id. There was a five-month delay during which the Cities were forced to purchase from Edison at a higher cost. Id. at 8-9. Then Edison decided that the transmission system did not need reinforcement. Id. at 8. 16. Edison also refused to provide a service priority equal to that of native load. It would curtail the Cities in order to purchase more economy energy for itself. McCann testimony at 28. If Edison could make the purchase, it would curtail the City and use the energy for itself. Id.= =20 When Edison curtailed the Cities, they were not able to =20 4/ Special Condition 12 of the Integrated Operations Agreement between Edison and the Southern Cities defined certain Special Condition 12 resources and allowed the Cities to make certain uses of those resources, subject to certain restrictions.=20 =0F, - 17 - purchase economy energy and instead purchased energy from Edison. Id. at 24. 17. According to Edison, the interruptible transmission it provided the Cities was interruptible for any reason. Id. at 20. A purchase could be terminated the hour after it is begun or even during the hour. Id. As a result, the Cities lost opportunities to make advantageous economy purchases. Id. at 20-21. =20 18. Edison also refused to provide customers flexibility similar to the flexibility Edison provided itself. Edison's refusal to provide bi-directional transmission service restricted the Cities' abilities to purchase hydroelectric energy from the Pacific Northwest.=20 Hoyt testimony at 22. Because most contracts with Northwest utilities require a return of power, the Northwest utilities would not deal with the Cities without transmission to return energy. Id. at 22-23. Edison did provide bi- directional transmission to the Los Angeles Department of Water & Power (LADWP) to accommodate flows to and from Arizona. Id. 19. Riverside was unable to obtain non-firm service more than two hours in advance of need. Carnahan testimony at 18. 20. Riverside and Colton were both served out of Edison's Vista substation. Although the two cities were on the same 69 kV bus, Edison would not allow them to sell =0F, - 18 - energy to each other. Greenwalt testimony at 17.=20 21. Riverside's agreement with Edison allowed Riverside to purchase a block of energy through the WSPP and divide it up among the four Cities (Azusa, Banning, Colton and Riverside). Greenwalt testimony at 17. When Riverside had excess energy from other sources, Edison would not permit it to sell that energy to the other three cities.=20 Id. For example, Riverside attempted to sell Deseret energy transmitted by LADWP to the Edison system. Id. at 17-18.=20 LADWP would not break out the Cities' shares of that energy, and Edison would not accept the energy as a delivery for all four cities. Id. at 18. Edison argued that because this energy was excess energy that Riverside could not use, Riverside did not have transmission rights to bring it into the control area. Id. As a result, Riverside paid for the energy delivered by LADWP to the Edison control area, but could not sell it to the other three cities, and gave it to Edison itself, which consumed the energy without making any payment for it. Id. Riverside tried a number of alternative paths, including using WSPP transmission where Riverside paid Edison 5 mills to connect to Azusa, 5 mills to connect to Banning, and 5 mills to connect to Colton for each megawatthour. While this approach was successful for a while, eventually Edison refused to permit these sales. =20 22. Edison claimed that the Cities only have transmission rights to bring in enough Special Condition 12 =0F, - 19 - energy to satisfy the Cities' load. Greenwalt testimony at 18. =20 23. Edison contended that the Cities' load requirements were satisfied first by integrated resources and then by Special Condition 12 and economy energy purchases. Id. at 19. When the Cities' integrated resources exceeded their load, any Special Condition 12 resources became excess. Under Riverside's Deseret contract, the Cities were required to take a minimum of 35 MW each hour. Id. Edison acknowledged that it was obligated to buy, or allow the Cities to sell, any excess energy from Riverside's integrated resources. Id. However, Edison refused to give the Cities credit for excess Special Condition 12 energy brought into the area, claiming that the Cities could not have brought it in because they did not have transmission rights. Id. =20 II. Other Examples of Transmission Disputes Disputes over transmission are not uncommon, contrary to EEI's suggestion. Some recent examples taken from pleadings and other documents and from Commission orders reveal that it has been very difficult for various entities in the electric power industry to agree on transmission rights. These examples also reveal that even after issuance of AEP and the Open Access NOPR with its proposed pro forma tariffs, there has been considerable controversy over whether various utilities' "open access" tariffs deviate from those tariffs. (The Commission has allowed =0F, - 20 - utilities that adopt tariffs that match or exceed the non-rate terms and conditions in the NOPR pro forma tariffs to obtain certain benefits.) A. In a letter of February 3, 1995 to Mr. Gerald Richman of the Commission's Enforcement section in the Office of the General Counsel, Steven J. Kean, Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, Enron Power Marketing, Inc. (Enron) alleged that Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NiMo) refused to wheel power from Rochester Gas & Electric (RG&E) to Enron under RG&E's transmission contract with NiMo; however, when Enron revealed the buyer, NiMo did wheel power for RG&E to the buyer. Mr. Kean alleged that this was not an isolated incident. NiMo argued that the contract did not require it to provide RG&E with transmission to Enron. It also said that the principle of comparability does not require the service. Letter of November 21, 1994 from NiMo representative A. Karen Hill to Gerald Richman. B. The Commission's Task Force Hot Line (Hot Line) received a complaint that a member of the New York Power Pool (NYPP) refused to transmit power that another member bought from a power marketer. In a letter of November 17, 1994, from Chair Moler to Mr. William J. Balet, Executive Director of NYPP, Chair Moler explained that the Commission's enforcement staff had investigated and found the allegation to be true. =0F, - 21 - C. In Southern Minnesota Municipal Power Agency v. Northern States Power Company (Minnesota), 73 FERC =0F4 61,350 (1995), NSP and SMMPA had a contract under which NSP agreed to provide transmission service. However, the parties had numerous disputes over the service.=20 The Commission found that NSP had misinterpreted the contract in several ways. For, example, SMMPA argued that it should be able to directly schedule its deliveries of energy out of the NSP control area and that it should not be limited to particular points of delivery. NSP argued that only it was entitled to control the physical operation of scheduling. The Commission found that the clear language of the contracts gave SMMPA the authority to schedule its own power. =20 D. Mid-Continent Area Power Pool, 72 FERC =0F4 61,223 (1995), involved MAPP's membership criteria, which made it impossible for a power marketer to join MAPP and obtain the benefits of certain transmission services available only to MAPP members. The Commission found that the membership criteria may be unreasonable, particularly since there may be less burdensome ways of setting up membership criteria for non-traditional entities. =20 =0F,