Message-ID: <28609543.1075841479755.JavaMail.evans@thyme> Date: Wed, 9 May 2001 17:04:00 -0700 (PDT) From: cooper.richey@enron.com To: chris.wiebe@enron.com, colin.tip@enron.com Subject: Confirmed Worm Attack Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-From: Cooper Richey X-To: Chris Wiebe , Colin Poon Tip X-cc: X-bcc: X-Folder: \ExMerge - Richey, Cooper\'Sent Mail X-Origin: RICHEY-C X-FileName: cooper richey 6-26-02.PST please look into this. apparently a web server in portland was infected so it is no joke. ---------------------- Forwarded by Cooper Richey/CAL/ECT on 05/09/2001 10:58 AM --------------------------- From: Robert Anderson/ENRON@enronXgate on 05/09/2001 11:58 AM CDT To: Cooper Richey/CAL/ECT@ECT cc: Subject: Confirmed Worm Attack The alert that we sent out yesterday was only half of what has now been confirmed as a "worm" attack. For those not familiar with the term, a worm is an attack program that automatically launches a new attack from each machine that it breaks into. This particular worm is attacking both Microsoft IIS servers (which we knew) and Sun Solaris systems. The CERT advisory discussing the worm is attached below. The Solaris vulnerability is a bug that was discovered two years ago, and the patch has been available. Hopefully, very few of our systems will have this vulnerability, but two EBS servers that we are aware of have already been compromised. Compromised Sun systems are used to launch further attacks and may be seen by others as Enron systems launching attacks. Please check immediately to ensure that all of your Internet facing servers have either had the patches installed or are not running the affected software. We have contacted the FBI to report these attacks. If you do discover any other compromised servers please make backups of all logs and files that may have been uploaded to the server. Please contact me if you have any questions at 713-853-9373. Thanks, Mark Thibodeaux IT Compliance Enron Corp. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- CERT Advisory CA-2001-11 sadmind/IIS Worm Original release date: May 08, 2001 Last revised: -- Source: CERT/CC A complete revision history is at the end of this file. Systems Affected * Systems running unpatched versions of Microsoft IIS * Systems running unpatched versions of Solaris up to, and including, Solaris 7 Overview The CERT/CC has received reports of a new piece of self-propagating malicious code (referred to here as the sadmind/IIS worm). The worm uses two well-known vulnerabilities to compromise systems and deface web pages. I. Description Based on preliminary analysis, the sadmind/IIS worm exploits a vulnerability in Solaris systems and subsequently installs software to attack Microsoft IIS web servers. In addition, it includes a component to propagate itself automatically to other vulnerable Solaris systems. It will add "+ +" to the .rhosts file in the root user's home directory. Finally, it will modify the index.html on the host Solaris system after compromising 2,000 IIS systems. To compromise the Solaris systems, the worm takes advantage of a two-year-old buffer overflow vulnerability in the Solstice sadmind program. For more information on this vulnerability, see http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/28934 http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html After successfully compromising the Solaris systems, it uses a seven-month-old vulnerability to compromise the IIS systems. For additional information about this vulnerability, see http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677 Solaris systems that are successfully compromised via the worm exhibit the following characteristics: * Sample syslog entry from compromised Solaris system May 7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Bus Error - c ore dumped May 7 02:40:01 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time May 7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time May 7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Segmentation Fault - core dumped May 7 02:40:03 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time May 7 02:40:06 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Segmentation Fault - core dumped May 7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Hangup May 7 02:40:08 carrier.domain.com last message repeated 1 time May 7 02:44:14 carrier.domain.com inetd[139]: /usr/sbin/sadmind: Killed * A rootshell listening on TCP port 600 * Existence of the directories * /dev/cub contains logs of compromised machines * /dev/cuc contains tools that the worm uses to operate and propagate Running processes of the scripts associated with the worm, such as the following: * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/sadmin.sh * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 111 * /dev/cuc/grabbb -t 3 -a .yyy.yyy -b .xxx.xxx 80 * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/uniattack.sh * /bin/sh /dev/cuc/time.sh * /usr/sbin/inetd -s /tmp/.f * /bin/sleep 300 Microsoft IIS servers that are successfully compromised exhibit the following characteristics: * Modified web pages that read as follows: fuck USA Government fuck PoizonBOx contact:sysadmcn@yahoo.com.cn * Sample Log from Attacked IIS Server 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \ GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir 200 - 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \ GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe /c+dir+..\ 200 - 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \ GET /scripts/../../winnt/system32/cmd.exe \ /c+copy+\winnt\system32\cmd.exe+root.exe 502 - 2001-05-06 12:20:19 10.10.10.10 - 10.20.20.20 80 \ GET /scripts/root.exe /c+echo+\ <HTML code inserted here>.././index.asp 502 - II. Impact Solaris systems compromised by this worm are being used to scan and compromise other Solaris and IIS systems. IIS systems compromised by this worm can suffer modified web content. Intruders can use the vulnerabilities exploited by this worm to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on vulnerable Solaris systems, and arbitrary commands with the privileges of the IUSR_machinename account on vulnerable Windows systems. We are receiving reports of other activity, including one report of files being destroyed on the compromised Windows machine, rendering them unbootable. It is unclear at this time if this activity is directly related to this worm. III. Solutions Apply a patch from your vendor A patch is available from Microsoft at http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS00-078.asp For IIS Version 4: http://www.microsoft.com/ntserver/nts/downloads/critical/q26986 2/default.asp For IIS Version 5: http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/critical/q269862 /default.asp Additional advice on securing IIS web servers is available from http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/iis5chk.asp http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/tools.asp Apply a patch from Sun Microsystems as described in Sun Security Bulletin #00191: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=se cbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba Appendix A. Vendor Information Microsoft Corporation The following documents regarding this vulnerability are available from Microsoft: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-023.asp Sun Microsystems Sun has issued the following bulletin for this vulnerability: http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doctype=coll&doc=se cbull/191&type=0&nav=sec.sba References 1. Vulnerability Note VU#111677: Microsoft IIS 4.0 / 5.0 vulnerable to directory traversal via extended unicode in url (MS00-078) http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/111677 2. CERT Advisory CA-1999-16 Buffer Overflow in Sun Solstice AdminSuite Daemon sadmind http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-1999-16.html Authors: Chad Dougherty, Shawn Hernan, Jeff Havrilla, Jeff Carpenter, Art Manion, Ian Finlay, John Shaffer ______________________________________________________________________ This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-11.html ______________________________________________________________________ CERT/CC Contact Information Email: cert@cert.org Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) Fax: +1 412-268-6989 Postal address: CERT Coordination Center Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 U.S.A. CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information. Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site http://www.cert.org/ To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to majordomo@cert.org. Please include in the body of your message subscribe cert-advisory * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. ______________________________________________________________________ NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. _________________________________________________________________ Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University. Revision History May 08, 2001: Initial Release -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use Charset: noconv iQCVAwUBOvd6LAYcfu8gsZJZAQFyUAP8DVaGiB1G7LM2FFsx5YEWEIPFD8Qt/HDI A+GTyi/LA2JUAVCA5GX5GCMqMOoKEczYJCAIysoacal7YOJOTZliTqCQQV1tbK+8 8J3IdSRBo5oKsAKeQ5M2Hg78uZPGJwOwooNoQDsKzxVJXo0Bng3YBtiIVG3flg6x 8IoirGdclIw= =+B8w -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----