Message-ID: <13126000.1075857533496.JavaMail.evans@thyme> Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2000 01:57:00 -0700 (PDT) From: jeffrey.shankman@enron.com To: mike.mcconnell@enron.com Subject: Selldown of Metgas Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-From: Jeffrey A Shankman X-To: Mike McConnell X-cc: X-bcc: X-Folder: \Jeffrey_Shankman_Jun2001\Notes Folders\Discussion threads X-Origin: Shankman-J X-FileName: jshankm.nsf any thoughts? ---------------------- Forwarded by Jeffrey A Shankman/HOU/ECT on 10/10/2000 08:58 AM --------------------------- Rick Bergsieker@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT 10/08/2000 09:21 AM To: Jeffrey A Shankman@ECT cc: Wade Cline/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT, Clay Harris/ENRON_DEVELOPMENT@ENRON_DEVELOPMENT Subject: Selldown of Metgas The partial sale of Enron India's 100% interest in Metgas is on Cliff Baxter's list of corporate assets for sale. As I expressed in our recent telephone conversation, I view Metgas as a key asset that could be of great value to the EGM LNG network. I believe that Enron should reconsider whether or not a Metgas selldown is a wise move at this time for the following reasons: 1. The Dabhol LNG terminal is ideally located for future LNG arbitrage plays, i.e., halfway between middle east and far east LNG suppliers. Opportunites for Mideast/Far East swaps or shipping backhauls could generate significant value for EGM. 2. Metgas currently holds exclusive rights to use Dabhol's LNG terminal for imports of LNG into India, and it will be at least several years (if ever) before a second LNG terminal is built in India. We should not be giving this strategic position away. 3. The fact that our competitors (e.g., Petronas, BP, BG etc.) want to buy in is an indicator that we have something of value. Even a partial selldown (and granting of voting rights) to one of these players could serously compromise our optionality and ability to maximize value to Enron. 4. I suspect that the market value of Metgas at this time (given that there is still significant developement risk) is fairly small relative to its network value to EGM. If, in spite of my arguments, a decison is made to sell down Metgas, there are two things that we could do to limit the damage: 1. Prior to the sale, sign an agreement between EGM and Metgas that provides EGM with exclusive rights to use the terminal, and 2. EGM should step into the Metgas/Malaysia LNG contract (i.e., EGM should buy from Malaysia and resell to Metgas) to ensure that we maintain maximum optionality in this contract. We could do this in a way that gives us control of the contract but passes Metgas risk through EGM and back to Malaysia. I understand that the time fuse for this selldown is very short---immediate action is needed if you want a vote on this. Rick