YALE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE

CPSC 467a: Cryptography and Computer Security

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Lecture Notes 12

48 Generating RSA Modulus

We finally turn to the question of generating the RSA modulus, n = pq. Recall that the numbers p and q should be random distinct primes of about the same length. The method for finding p and q is similar to the "guess-and-check" method used in Section 45 to find random numbers in \mathbb{Z}_n^* . Namely, keep generating random numbers p of the right length until a prime is found. Then keep generating random numbers q of the right length until one is found that is prime and different from p.

To generate a random prime of a given length, say k bits long, generate k - 1 random bits, put a "1" at the front, regard the result as binary number, and test if it is prime. We defer the question of how to test if the number is prime and look now at the expected number of trials before this procedure will terminate.

The above procedure samples uniformly from the set $B_k = \mathbf{Z}_{2^k} - \mathbf{Z}_{2^{k-1}}$ of binary numbers of length exactly k. Let p_k be the fraction of elements in B_k that are prime. Then the expected number of trials to find a prime will be $1/p_k$. While p_k is difficult to determine exactly, the celebrated *Prime* Number Theorem allows us to get a good estimate on that number.

Let $\pi(n)$ be the number of numbers $\leq n$ that are prime. For example, $\pi(10) = 4$ since there are four primes ≤ 10 , namely, 2, 3, 5, 7. The prime number theorem asserts that $\pi(n)$ is "approximately" $n/(\ln n)$, where $\ln n$ is the natural logarithm $\log_e n$.² The chance that a randomly picked number in \mathbf{Z}_n is prime is then $\pi(n-1)/n \approx ((n-1)/\ln(n-1))/n \approx 1/(\ln n)$.

Since $B_k = \mathbf{Z}_{2^k} - \mathbf{Z}_{2^{k-1}}$, we have

$$p_{k} = \frac{\pi(2^{k}-1) - \pi(2^{k-1}-1)}{2^{k-1}}$$
$$= \frac{2\pi(2^{k}-1)}{2^{k}} - \frac{\pi(2^{k-1}-1)}{2^{k-1}}$$
$$\approx \frac{2}{\ln 2^{k}} - \frac{1}{\ln 2^{k-1}} \approx \frac{1}{\ln 2^{k}}$$
$$= \frac{1}{k \ln 2}.$$

Hence, the expected number of trials before success is approximately $k \ln 2$. For k = 512, this works out to $512 \times 0.693 \ldots \approx 355$.

The remaining problem for generating an RSA key is how to test if a large number is prime. Until very recently, no deterministic polynomial time algorithm was known for testing primality, and even now it is not known whether any deterministic algorithm is feasible in practice. However, there do exist fast *probabilistic* algorithms for testing primality, which we now discuss.

¹We ignore the critical issue of how good an approximation this is in these notes. The interested reader is referred to a good mathematical text on number theory.

²Here e = 2.71828... is the base of the natural logarithm, not to be confused with the RSA encryption exponent, which, by an unfortunate choice of notation, we also denote by e.

49 Probabilistic Primality Tests

A deterministic test for primality is a procedure that, given as input an integer $n \ge 2$, correctly returns the answer 'composite' or 'prime'. To arrive at a probabilistic algorithm, we extend the notion of a deterministic primality test in two ways: We give it an extra "helper" string a, and we allow it to answer '?', meaning "I don't know". Given input n and helper string a, such an algorithm may correctly answer either 'composite' or '?' when n is composite, and it may correctly answer either 'prime' or '?' when n is prime. If the algorithm gives a non-"?" answer, we say that the helper string a is a witness to that answer.

We can use an extended primality test T(n, a) to build a strong probabilistic primality testing algorithm. On input n, do the following:

```
Algorithm P_1(n):

repeat forever {

Generate a random helper string a;

Let r = T(n, a);

if (r \neq `?`) return r;

};
```

This algorithm has the property that it might not terminate (in case there are no witnesses to the correct answer for n), but when it does terminate, the answer is correct.

We can trade off the possibility of non-termination for the possibility of failure to find a witness even when one exists. What we do is to add a parameter t which is the maximum number of trials that we are willing to perform. The algorithm then becomes:

```
Algorithm P_2(n, t):

repeat t times {

Generate a random helper string a;

Let r = T(n, a);

if (r \neq `?`) return r;

}

return `?`;
```

Now the algorithm is allowed to give up and return '?', but only after trying t times to find the correct answer. If there are lots of witnesses to the correct answer, then the probability will be high of finding one, so most of the time the algorithm will succeed.

Unfortunately, we do not know of any test that has lots of witnesses to the correct answer for every $n \ge 2$. Fortunately, a weaker test can still be useful.

50 Weak Tests of Compositeness

The tests that we will present are asymmetric. When n is composite, there are many witnesses to that effect, but when n is prime, there are none. Hence, the test either outputs 'composite' or '?' but never 'prime'. We call these *weak tests of compositeness* since an answer of 'composite' means that n is definitely composite, but these tests can never say for sure that n is prime.

When algorithm P_2 uses a weak test of compositeness, an answer of 'composite' likewise means that n is definitely composite. Moreover, if there are many witnesses to n's being composite and tis sufficiently large, then the probability that $P_2(n, t)$ outputs 'composite' will be high. However, if n is prime, then both the test and P_2 will always output '?'. It is tempting to interpret P_2 's output of '?' to mean "*n* is probably prime", but of course, it makes no sense to say that *n* is probably prime; *n* either is or is not prime. But what does make sense is to say that the probability is very small that P_2 answers '?' when *n* is composite.

In practice, we will indeed interpret the output '?' to mean 'prime', but we understand that the algorithm has the possibility of giving the wrong answer when n is composite. Whereas before our algorithm would only report an answer when it was sure and would answer '?' otherwise, now we are considering algorithms that are allowed to make mistakes with (hopefully) small probability.

51 **Reformulation of Weak Tests of Compositeness**

We can interpret a Boolean function $\tau(n, a)$ as a weak test of compositeness by taking an output of true to mean 'composite' and an output of false to mean '?'. We may also write $\tau_a(n)$ to mean $\tau(n, a)$. With this notation, if $\tau_a(n) = \text{true}$, we say that the test τ_a succeeds on n, and a is a witness to the compositeness of n. If $\tau_a(n) = \text{false}$, then the test fails and gives no information about the compositeness of n. Clearly, if n is prime, then τ_a fails on n for all a, but if n is composite, then τ_a may succeed for some values of a and fail for others.

A test of compositeness τ is *useful* if there is a feasible algorithm that computes $\tau(n, a)$, and for every composite number n, a fraction c > 0 of the tests τ_a succeed on n. Suppose for simplicity that c = 1/2 and one applies τ_a to n for 100 randomly-chosen values for a. If any of the τ_a succeeds, we have a proof a that n is composite. If all fail, we don't know whether or not n is prime or composite. But we do know that if n is composite, the probability that all 100 tests fail is only $1/2^{100}$.

In practice, we choose RSA primes p and q at random and apply some fixed number of randomly-chosen tests to each candidate,³ rejecting the candidate if it proves to be composite. We keep the candidate (and assume it to be prime) if all of the tests for compositeness fail. We never know whether or not our resulting numbers p and q really are prime, but we can adjust the parameters to reduce the probability to an acceptable level that we will end up a number p or q that is not prime (and hence that we have unwittingly generated a bad RSA key).

52 Example Weak Tests of Compositeness

Here are two examples of weak tests for compositeness. While neither is useful, they illustrate some of the ideas behind the useful tests that we will present later.

- Let δ_a(n) = (2 ≤ a ≤ n − 1 and a|n). Test δ_a succeeds on n if a is a proper divisor of n, which indeed implies that n is composite. Thus, {δ_a}_{a∈Z} is a valid test of compositeness. Unfortunately, it isn't very useful in a probabilistic primality algorithm since the number of tests that succeed when n is composite are too small. For example, if n = pq for p, q prime, then the only tests that succeed are δ_p and δ_q.
- 2. Let ζ_a(n) = (2 ≤ a ≤ n − 1 and a^{n−1} ≠ 1 (mod n). By Fermat's theorem, if p is prime and gcd(a, p) = 1, then a^{p−1} ≡ 1 (mod p). Hence, if ζ_a(n) succeeds, it must be the case that n is not prime. This shows that {ζ_a}_{a∈Z} is a valid test of compositeness. For this test to be adequate for a probabilistic primality algorithm, we would need to know that for all composite numbers n, a significant fraction of the tests ζ_a succeed on n. Unfortunately, there are certain compositeness numbers n called *pseudoprimes* for which all of the tests ζ_a fail. Such n are fairly rare, but they do exist. The ζ_a tests are unable to distinguish pseudoprimes from true primes, so they are not adequate for testing primality.

³This is what Algorithm P_2 does.