CPSC 467b: Cryptography and Computer Security Lecture 9

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- Modular Arithmetic
- GCD
- Modular Multiplication

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We just saw that mod is a binary operation on integers.

Mod is also used to denote a relationship on integers:

 $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ iff $n \mid (a - b)$.

That is, a and b have the same remainder when divided by n. An immediate consequence of this definition is that

 $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$ iff $(a \mod n) = (b \mod n)$.

Thus, the two notions of mod aren't so different after all!

We sometimes write $a \equiv_n b$ to mean $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$.

Mod is an equivalence relation

The two-place relationship \equiv_n is an *equivalence relation*.

Its equivalence classes are called *residue* classes modulo *n* and are denoted by $[b]_{\equiv_n} = \{a \mid a \equiv b \pmod{n}\}$ or simply by [b].

For example, if n = 7, then $[10] = \{\ldots -11, -4, 3, 10, 17, \ldots\}$.

Fact

[a] = [b] iff $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$.

If $x \in [b]$, then x is said to be a *representative* or *name* of the equivalence class [b]. Obviously, b is a representative of [b]. Thus, [-11], [-4], [3], [10], [17] are all names for the same equivalence class.

The *canonical* or preferred name for the class [b] is the unique integer in $[b] \cap \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$.

Thus, the canonical name for [10] is 10 mod 7 = 3.

The relation \equiv_n is a *congruence relation* with respect to addition, subtraction, and multiplication of integers.

Fact

For each arithmetic operation $\odot \in \{+, -, \times\}$, if $a \equiv a' \pmod{n}$ and $b \equiv b' \pmod{n}$, then

$$a \odot b \equiv a' \odot b' \pmod{n}$$
.

The class containing the result of $a \odot b$ depends only on the classes to which a and b belong and not the particular representatives chosen.

Hence, we can perform arithmetic on equivalence classes by operating on their names.

Ring of integers mod n

Let **Z** denote the set of all integers, positive and negative. Let $Z_n \subseteq Z$ contain the non-negative integers less than *n*, that is,

$$\mathbf{Z}_n = \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\}.$$

We now define addition, subtraction, and multiplication operations directly on Z_n :

$$a \oplus b = (a+b) \mod n$$

$$a \oplus b = (a-b) \mod n$$

$$a \otimes b = (a \times b) \mod n$$
(1)

We will sometimes write $+, -, \times$ in place of \oplus, \ominus, \otimes , respectively, when it is clear from context that they are to be regarded as operations over Z_n rather than over Z.

Greatest common divisor

Definition

The greatest common divisor of two integers a and b, written gcd(a, b), is the largest integer d such that $d \mid a$ and $d \mid b$.

gcd(a, b) is always defined unless a = b = 0 since 1 is a divisor of every integer, and the divisor of a non-zero number cannot be larger (in absolute value) than the number itself.

Question: Why isn't gcd(0,0) well defined?

Computing the GCD

gcd(a, b) is easily computed if a and b are given in factored form.

Namely, let p_i be the i^{th} prime. Write $a = \prod p_i^{e_i}$ and $b = \prod p_i^{f_i}$. Then

 $gcd(a, b) = \prod p_i^{\min(e_i, f_i)}.$

Example: $168 = 2^3 \cdot 3 \cdot 7$ and $450 = 2 \cdot 3^2 \cdot 5^2$, so $gcd(168, 450) = 2 \cdot 3 = 6$.

However, factoring is believed to be a hard problem, and no polynomial-time factorization algorithm is currently known. (If it were easy, then Eve could use it to break RSA, and RSA would be of no interest as a cryptosystem.)

Fortunately, gcd(a, b) can be computed efficiently without the need to factor a and b using the famous *Euclidean algorithm*.

Euclid's algorithm is remarkable, not only because it was discovered a very long time ago, but also because it works without knowing the factorization of a and b.

The Euclidean algorithm relies on several identities satisfied by the gcd function. In the following, assume a > 0 and $a \ge b \ge 0$:

$$gcd(a, b) = gcd(b, a)$$
 (2)

$$gcd(a,0) = a \tag{3}$$

$$gcd(a,b) = gcd(a-b,b)$$
 (4)

Identity 2 is obvious from the definition of gcd. Identity 3 follows from the fact that every positive integer divides 0. Identity 4 follows from the basic fact relating divides and addition from lecture 8.

Computing GCD without factoring

The Euclidean identities allow the problem of computing gcd(a, b) to be reduced to the problem of computing gcd(a - b, b).

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The new problem is "smaller" as long as b > 0.
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The size of the problem gcd(a, b) is a + b, the sum of the two arguments. This leads to an easy recursive algorithm.
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```
int gcd(int a, int b)
{
    if ( a < b ) return gcd(b, a);
    else if ( b == 0 ) return a;
    else return gcd(a-b, b);
}</pre>
```

Nevertheless, this algorithm is not very efficient, as you will quickly discover if you attempt to use it, say, to compute gcd(100000, 2).

Repeatedly applying identity (4) to the pair (a, b) until it can't be applied any more produces the sequence of pairs

 $(a, b), (a - b, b), (a - 2b, b), \dots, (a - qb, b).$

The sequence stops when a - qb < b.

How many times you can subtract b from a while remaining non-negative?

Using division in place of repeated subtractions

The number of times is the quotient $\lfloor a/b \rfloor$.

The amout a - qb that is left after q subtractions is just the remainder $a \mod b$.

Hence, one can go directly from the pair (a, b) to the pair $(a \mod b, b)$, giving the identity

 $gcd(a, b) = gcd(a \mod b, b).$ (5)

Full Euclidean algorithm

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Recall the inefficient GCD algorithm.
int gcd(int a, int b) {
  if (a < b) return gcd(b, a);
  else if ( b == 0 ) return a;
  else return gcd(a-b, b);
}
The following algorithm is exponentially faster.
int gcd(int a, int b) {
  if (b == 0) return a;
  else return gcd(b, a%b);
}
Principal change: Replace gcd(a-b,b) with gcd(b, a%b).
Besides collapsing repeated subtractions, we have a \ge b for all but
the top-level call on gcd(a, b). This eliminates roughly half of the
remaining recursive calls.
```

Complexity of GCD

The new algorithm requires at most in O(n) stages, where *n* is the sum of the lengths of *a* and *b* when written in binary notation, and each stage involves at most one remainder computation.

The following iterative version eliminates the stack overhead:

```
int gcd(int a, int b) {
    int aa;
    while (b > 0) {
        aa = a;
        a = b;
        b = aa % b;
    }
    return a;
}
```

Relatively prime numbers

Two integers *a* and *b* are *relatively prime* if they have no common prime factors, or equivalently, if gcd(a, b) = 1. Let $\mathbf{Z}_n^* \subseteq \mathbf{Z}_n$ contain those integers that are relatively prime to *n*, so

$$\mathbf{Z}_n^* = \{ a \in \mathbf{Z}_n \mid \gcd(a, n) = 1 \}.$$

Euler's totient function $\phi(n)$

 $\phi(n)$ is the cardinality of \mathbf{Z}_n^* , i.e., $\phi(n) = |\mathbf{Z}_n^*|$. Properties of $\phi(n)$:

- If p is prime, then $\phi(p) = p 1$.
- More generally, if p is prime and $k \ge 1$, then $\phi(p^k) = p^k p^{k-1} = (p-1)p^{k-1}$.
- 3 If gcd(m, n) = 1, then $\phi(mn) = \phi(m)\phi(n)$.

Example: $\phi(26)$

Can compute $\phi(n)$ for all $n \ge 1$ given the factorization of n.

$$\phi(126) = \phi(2) \cdot \phi(3^2) \cdot \phi(7)$$

= $(2-1) \cdot (3-1)(3^{2-1}) \cdot (7-1)$
= $1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 6 = 36.$

The 36 elements of \mathbf{Z}_{126}^* are:

1, 5, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 25, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 55, 59, 61, 65, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 85, 89, 95, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 115, 121, 125.

A formula for $\phi(n)$

Here is an explicit formula for $\phi(n)$.

Theorem

Write n in factored form, so $n = p_1^{e_1} \cdots p_k^{e_k}$, where p_1, \ldots, p_k are distinct primes and e_1, \ldots, e_k are positive integers.^a Then

$$\phi(n) = (p_1 - 1) \cdot p_1^{e_1 - 1} \cdots (p_k - 1) \cdot p_k^{e_k - 1}.$$

 a By the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, every integer can be written uniquely in this way up to the ordering of the factors.

When p is prime, we have simply $\phi(p) = (p-1)$, so for the product of two distinct primes, $\phi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1)$.



Recall the operation \otimes is defined on all of \mathbf{Z}_n .



In words, if a and b are both in \mathbf{Z}_n^* , then $a \otimes b$ is also in \mathbf{Z}_n^* .

Proof.

If neither a nor b share a prime factor with n, then neither does their product ab.

\mathbf{Z}_n^* is an Abelean group

An *Abelean group* is a set with an associative and commutative binary operation having left and right inverses and an identity element.

 \mathbf{Z}_n^* under \otimes is an Abelean group. This means that it satisfies the following properties:

Associativity \otimes is an associative binary operation on \mathbf{Z}_n^* . In particular, \mathbf{Z}_n^* is closed under \otimes .

Identity 1 is an identity element for \otimes in \mathbf{Z}_n^* , that is $1 \otimes x = x \otimes 1 = x$ for all $x \in \mathbf{Z}_n^*$.

Inverses For all $x \in \mathbf{Z}_n^*$, there exists another element $x^{-1} \in \mathbf{Z}_n^*$ such that $x \otimes x^{-1} = x^{-1} \otimes x = 1$.

Commutativity \otimes is commutative, i.e., $x \otimes y = y \otimes x$ for all $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$.

Example: \mathbf{Z}_{26}^*

Let $n = 26 = 2 \cdot 13$. Then $\mathbf{Z}_{26}^* = \{1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25\}$ $\phi(26) = |\mathbf{Z}_{26}^*| = 12.$

Inverses of the elements in \mathbf{Z}_{26}^* :

X	1	3	5	7	9	11	15	17	19	21	23	25
x^{-1}	1	9	21	15	3	19	7	23	11	5	17	25
\equiv_n	1	9	-5	-11	3	-7	7	-3	11	5	_9	-1

Bottom row gives equivalent integers in range $[-12, \ldots, 13]$. Note that $(26 - x)^{-1} = -x^{-1}$. Hence, last row reads same back to front except for change of sign. Once the inverses for the first six numbers are known, the rest of the table is easily filled in.

- It is not obvious from what I have said so far that inverses always exist for members of \mathbf{Z}_n^* .
- The fact that they do will become apparent later when we show how to compute inverses.

Repeated multiplication in a finite group

General property of finite groups: If any element x is repeatedly multiplied by itself, the result is eventually 1.

Example, for $x = 5 \in \mathbf{Z}_{26}^*$: 5, 25, 21, 1, 5, 25, 21, 1,...

Let x^k denote the result of multiplying x by itself k times. The order of x, written ord(x), is the smallest integer $k \ge 1$ for which $x^k = 1$.

Note added after class: The first repeated element must be x. If not, then some $y \neq x$ is the first to repeat. The element immediately preceding each occurrence of y is yx^{-1} . But then yx^{-1} is the first to repeat, a contradiction. Hence, $x = x^{k+1}$ for some $k \ge 1$, so $x^k = x^{k+1}x^{-1} = xx^{-1} = 1$.

Euler's and Fermat's theorem

For any group, ord(x) divides the order (# elements) of the group.

For \mathbf{Z}_n^* , we therefore have $\operatorname{ord}(x) | \phi(n)$.

Theorem (Euler's theorem)

$$x^{\phi(n)}\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$
 for all $x\in {\sf Z}_n^*.$

As a special case, we have

Theorem (Fermat's theorem)

 $x^{(p-1)} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ for all $x, 1 \leq x \leq p-1$, where p is prime.

An important corollary

Corollary

Let
$$r \equiv s \pmod{\phi(n)}$$
. Then $a^r \equiv a^s \pmod{n}$ for all $a \in \mathbf{Z}_n^*$

Proof.

If $r \equiv s \pmod{\phi(n)}$, then $r = s + u\phi(n)$ for some integer u. Then using Euler's theorem, we have

$$a^r \equiv a^{s+u\phi(n)} \equiv a^s \cdot (a^u)^{\phi(n)} \equiv a^s \cdot 1 \equiv a^s \pmod{n},$$

as desired.

Recall the RSA encryption and decryption functions

$$E_e(m) = m^e \mod n$$

 $D_d(c) = c^d \mod n$

where n = pq is the product of two distinct large primes p and q.

This corollary gives a sufficient condition on e and d to ensure that the resulting cryptosystem works. That is, we require that

 $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$.

Then $D_d(E_e(m)) \equiv m^{ed} \equiv m^1 \equiv m \pmod{n}$ for all messages $m \in \mathbf{Z}_n^*$.

What about the case of messages $m \in Z_n - Z_n^*$? There are several answers to this question.

- Alice doesn't really want to send such messages if she can avoid it.
- 2 If Alice sends random messages, her probability of choosing a message not in \mathbf{Z}_n^* is very small only about $2/\sqrt{n}$.
- SA does in fact work for all m ∈ Z_n, even though Euler's theorem fails for m ∉ Z_n^{*}.

Why Alice might want to avoid sending messages not in \mathbf{Z}_n^*

If $m \in \mathbf{Z}_n - \mathbf{Z}_n^*$, either $p \mid m$ or $q \mid m$ (but not both because m < pq).

If Alice ever sends such a message and Eve is astute enough to compute gcd(m, n) (which she can easily do), then Eve will succeed in breaking the cryptosystem.

Why?

The number of messages in $\mathbf{Z}_n - \mathbf{Z}_n^*$ is only

$$n-\phi(n)=pq-(p-1)(q-1)=p+q-1$$

out of a total of n = pq messages altogether.

If p and q are both 512 bits long, then the probability of choosing a bad message is only about $2 \cdot 2^{512}/2^{1024} = 1/2^{511}$.

Such a low-probability event will likely never occur during the lifetime of the universe.

For $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n - \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, RSA works anyway, but for different reasons. For example, if m = 0, it is clear that $(0^e)^d \equiv 0 \pmod{n}$, yet Euler's theorem fails since $0^{\phi(n)} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.

We omit the proof of this curiosity.