CPSC 467: Cryptography and Security

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Security of Digital Signatures

Forgery

Using Digital Signatures

Adding redundancy

Signing Message Digests

Combining Encryption and Signatures
Security of Digital Signatures
Desired security properties of digital signatures

Digital signatures must be difficult to forge.

Some increasingly stringent notions of forgery-resistance:

- Resistance to forging valid signature for particular message $m$.
- Above, but where adversary knows a set of valid signed messages $(m_1, s_1), \ldots, (m_k, s_k)$, and $m \notin \{m_1, \ldots, m_k\}$.
- Above, but where adversary can choose a set of valid signed messages, specifying either the messages (corresponding to a chosen plaintext attack) or the signatures (corresponding to chosen ciphertext attack).
- Any of the above, but where one wishes to protect against generating any valid signed message $(m', s')$ different from those already seen, not just for a particular predetermined $m$. This is called existential forgery.
Forging random RSA signed messages

RSA signatures are indeed vulnerable to existential forgery.

An attacker simply chooses \( s' \) at random and computes
\[
m' = E_e(s').
\]

The signed message \((m', s')\) is trivially valid since the verification predicate is simply \( m' = E_e(s') \).
Importance of random signed messages

One often wants to sign random strings.

For example, in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol discussed in lecture 10, Alice and Bob exchange random-looking numbers $a = g^x \mod p$ and $b = g^y \mod p$.

In order to discourage man-in-the-middle attacks, they may wish to sign these strings (assuming they already have each other’s public verification keys).

With RSA signatures, Mallory could feed bogus signed values to Alice and Bob. The signatures would check, and both would think they had successfully established a shared key $k$ when in fact they had not.
Using Digital Signatures
Adding redundancy

Recall: RSA signatures are subject to existential forgery.

Redundancy can be used to prevent this.

Example: Prefix a fixed string \( \sigma \) to the front of each message before signing.

This gives rise to a variant RSA signature scheme \((S^\sigma_d, V^\sigma_e)\).

- Signing function: \( S^\sigma_d(m) = D_d(\sigma m) \)
- Verification predicate: \( V^\sigma_e(m, s) \iff \sigma m = E_e(s) \).
Security of signatures with fixed redundancy

The security of this scheme depends on the mixing properties of the encryption and decryption functions, that is, the extent to which each output bit depends on most of the input bits.

Not all cryptosystems mix well.

For example, a block cipher used in ECB mode (see lecture 6 and lecture 8) encrypts a block at a time, so each block of output bits depends only on the corresponding block of input bits.
Forging signatures with fixed redundancy

Suppose it happens that

\[ S^\sigma_d(m) = D_d(\sigma m) = D_d(\sigma) \cdot D_d(m). \]

Then Mallory can forge random messages assuming he knows just one valid signed message \((m_0, s_0)\). Here’s how.

- He knows that \( s_0 = D_d(\sigma) \cdot D_d(m) \), so from \( s_0 \) he extracts the prefix \( s_{00} = D_d(\sigma) \).
- He now chooses a random \( s'_{01} \) and computes \( m' = E_e(s'_{01}) \) and \( s' = s_{00} \cdot s'_{01} \).
- The signed message \((m', s')\) is valid since
  \[ E_e(s') = E_e(s_{00} \cdot s'_{01}) = E_e(s_{00}) \cdot E_e(s'_{01}) = \sigma m'. \]
Signing Message Digests
Message digests

A better way to prevent forgery is to sign a *message digest* of the message rather than sign $m$ itself.

A message digest function $h$, also called a *cryptographic one-way hash function* or a *fingerprint function*, maps long strings to short random-looking strings.

- To sign a message $m$, Alice computes $S_d(m) = D_d(h(m))$.
- To verify the signature $s$, Bob checks that $h(m) = E_e(s)$.
Forging signed message digests

For Mallory to generate a forged signed message \((m', s')\) he must somehow come up with \(m'\) and \(s'\) satisfying

\[ h(m') = E_e(s') \]  

That is, he must find \(m'\) and \(s'\) that both map to the same string, where \(m'\) is mapped by \(h\) and \(s'\) by \(E_e\).

Two natural approaches for attempting to satisfying (1):

1. Pick \(m'\) at random and solve for \(s'\).
2. Pick \(s'\) at random and solve for \(m'\).
Approach 1: Solve for $s'$

Equation:

$$h(m') = E_e(s')$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

To solve for $s'$ given $m'$ requires computing

$$E_e^{-1}(h(m')) = D_d(h(m')) = s'.$$

Alice can compute $D_d$, which is what enables her to sign messages.

But Mallory presumably cannot compute $D_d$ without knowing $d$, for if he could, he could also break the underlying cryptosystem.
Approach 2: Solve for $m'$

Equation:

$$h(m') = E_e(s')$$

(1)

To solve for $m'$ given $s'$ requires “inverting” $h$.

Since $h$ is many-one, a value $y = E_e(s')$ can have many “inverses” or preimages.

To successfully forge a signed message, Mallory needs to find only one value $m'$ such that $h(m') = E_e(s')$.

However, the defining property of a cryptographic hash function is that, given $y$, it should be hard to find any $x \in h^{-1}(y)$.

Hence, Mallory cannot feasibly find $m'$ satisfying 1.
Other attempts

Of course, these are not the only two approaches that Mallory might take.

Perhaps there are ways of generating valid signed messages \((m', s')\) where \(m'\) and \(s'\) are generated together.

I do not know of such a method, but this doesn’t say one doesn’t exist.
More advantages of signing message digests

Another advantage of signing message digests rather than signing messages directly: the signatures are shorter.

An RSA signature of $m$ is roughly the same length as $m$.

An RSA signature of $h(m)$ is a fixed length, regardless of how long $m$ is.

For both reasons of security and efficiency, signed message digests are what is used in practice.

We’ll talk more about message digests later on.
Combining Encryption and Signatures
Signed encrypted messages

One often wants to encrypt messages for privacy and sign them for integrity and authenticity.

Let Alice have cryptosystem \((E, D)\) and signature system \((S, V)\). Some possibilities for encrypting and signing a message \(m\):

1. Alice separately encrypts and signs the message and sends the pair \(E(m) \circ S(m)\).

2. Alice signs the encrypted message and sends the pair \(E(m) \circ S(E(m))\).

3. Alice encrypts the signed message and sends the result \(E(m \circ S(m))\).

Here we assume a standard way of representing the ordered pair \((x, y)\) as a string, which we denote by \(x \circ y\).
Weakness of encrypt-and-sign

Method 1, sending the pair $E(m) \circ S(m)$, is quite problematic since *signature functions make no guarantee of privacy*.

We can construct a signature scheme $(S', V')$ in which the plaintext message is part of the signature itself.

If $(S', V')$ is used as the signature scheme in method 1, there is no privacy, for the plaintext message can be read directly from the signature.
A forgery-resistant signature scheme with no privacy

We construct a contrived but valid signature scheme in order to prove that not all signature schemes hide the message.

Let \((S, V)\) be an RSA signature scheme. Define

\[
S'(m) = m \circ S(m) ;
\]

\[
V'(m, s) = \exists t (s = m \circ t \land V(m, t)) .
\]

Facts

- \((S', V')\) is at least as secure as \((S, V)\).
- \(S'\) leaks \(m\).

Why? Suppose a forger produces a valid signed message \((m, s)\) in \((S', V')\). Then \(s = m \circ t\) for some \(t\) and \(V(m, t)\) holds.

Hence, \((m, t)\) is a valid signed message in \((S, V)\), and \(s\) leaks \(m\).
Why it works?

To conclude that \((S', V')\) is at least as secure against existential forgery as \((S, V)\), we used a proof by *reduction*: Namely, we reduced the security of \((S', V')\) to the security of \((S, V)\).

Turned around, if \((S', V')\) can be “broken”, then so can \((S, V)\).

Presuming that \((S, V)\) is secure against existential forgery, we conclude that \((S', V')\) is also secure.
Encrypt first

Recall method 2 (encrypt first): \((E(m), S(E(m)))\).

This allows Eve to verify that the signed message was sent by Alice, even though Eve cannot read it.

Whether or not this property is desirable is application-dependent.

This method should only be used with signature schemes that resist existential forgery.

If not, Mallory can forge a valid signed random ciphertext \((c, s)\).

Bob, seeing that \(c\) is valid, will proceed to decrypt \(c\) and act on the resulting message \(m\).
Sign first

Recall method 3 (sign first): $E(m \circ S(m))$.

This forces Bob to decrypt a bogus message before discovering that it wasn’t sent by Alice.

This method should only be used with signature schemes that resist existential forgery.

If not, Mallory can forge a valid signed random message $(m, s)$. Then she can use Bob’s public encryption key to encrypt $m \circ s$ and the result looks like it was produced by Alice.
Combining protocols

Subtleties emerge when cryptographic protocols are combined, even in a simple case like this where it is only desired to combine privacy with authenticity.

Think about the pros and cons of other possibilities, such as sign-encrypt-sign, i.e., \((E(m \circ S(m)), S(E(m \circ S(m))))\).

Does it also fail with forged random signed messages?