CPSC 467: Cryptography and Security

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Lamport One-Time Signatures

Merkle Signatures

Authentication Using Passwords
  Authentication problem
  Passwords authentication schemes
  Secure password storage
  Dictionary attacks
Lamport One-Time Signatures
Overview of Lamport signatures

Leslie Lamport devised a digital signature scheme based on hash functions rather than on public key cryptography.

Its drawback is that each key pair can be used to sign only one message.

We describe how Alice uses it to sign a 256-bit message. As with other signature schemes, it suffices to sign the hash of the actual message.

A **cryptographic hash function** maps an arbitrary message to a fixed length random-looking block. Such functions are designed to be one-way.
How signing works

The private *signing key* consists of a sequence $r = (r^1, \ldots, r^{256})$ of pairs $(r^k_0, r^k_1)$ of random numbers, $1 \leq k \leq 256$.

Let $m$ be a 256-bit message. Denote by $m_k$ the $k^{th}$ bit of $m$.

The *signature* of $m$ is the sequence of numbers $s = (s^1, \ldots, s^{256})$, where

$$s^k = r^k_{m_k}.$$

Thus, one element from the pair $(r^k_0, r^k_1)$ is used to sign $m_k$, so $s^k = r^k_0$ if $m_k = 0$ and $s^k = r^k_1$ if $m_k = 1$. 
How verification works

The public verification key consists of the sequence

\[ v = (v_1, \ldots, v_{256}) \]

of pairs \((v_0^k, v_1^k)\), where \(v_j^k = H(r_j^k)\), and \(H\) is any one-way function (such as a cryptographically strong hash function). Thus, \(v\) comprises the hashes of all random numbers in the private signing key \(r\).

To verify a signed message \((m, s)\), Bob checks that \(H(s^k) = v_{m_k}^k\) for each \(k\).

Assuming all is well, we have

\[ H(s^k) = H(r_{m_k}^k) = v_{m_k}^k \]

for all \(k\), so the verification succeeds.
Forgery resistance

Lamport signatures are one-time because half of the private key is released when it is used.

The revealed $r_j^k$ would allow anyone to construct a valid signature of the same message $m$, but that signature is already known and valid.

However, if other numbers of the private key are ever disclosed, then Eve could in general produce valid signatures of messages that have never been signed by Alice.
How to forge if the key is reused

Suppose Alice signs \( m \) and \( m' \) using the same private key.

Suppose further that \( m \) and \( m' \) differ in two bits \( j \) and \( \ell \). Then Eve can create a signature for the new message \( m'' \), where

\[
m''_k = \begin{cases} 
  m'_j & \text{if } k = j \\
  m_k & \text{if } k \neq j 
\end{cases}
\]

Example: \( m = 01101 \), \( m' = 00100 \). They differ in bit positions \( j = 2 \) and \( \ell = 5 \). Then Eve can produce a valid signature for \( m'' = 00101 \) even though Alice never signed \( m'' \).
Merkle Signatures
The Merkle signature scheme applies hash trees to Lamport signatures to allow a large number $N = 2^n$ of messages to be signed, yet each can be verified using the same short trusted verification key.

It works by creating $N$ Lamport signing keys $R_1, \ldots, R_N$ and $N$ corresponding verification keys $V_1, \ldots, V_N$. The $i^{th}$ message is signed using key pair $(R_i, V_i)$. 
Reducing the size of the trusted verification key

The problem here is the need for Bob to obtain and store the $N$ verification keys.

Rather than distributing all $V_i$ in advance, $V_i$ is sent to Bob along with the $i^{th}$ signed message since it is only needed to verify that one message.

But this creates the problem of validating $V_i$, since how does Bob know that $V_i$ is genuine rather than a fake designed to make a forged signature look good?
Hash trees to the rescue

Validating received data is what hash trees are good at.

When Alice creates the $N$ Lamport key pairs $(R_i, V_i)$, she puts all $V_i$ into a hash tree, computes top hash, and makes it public.

When she signs the $i^{th}$ message $m$, she creates a Lamport signature $s$ using the pair $(R_i, V_i)$ as before.

She then sends Bob $(m, s)$ along with $V_i$ and $B_i$, where $B_i$ is the validation block for $V_i$. 
Verifying the Merkle signature

We assume Bob knows top hash. He validates the signed message \((m, (s, i, V_i, B_i))\) in two steps:

1. He uses the Lamport signature verification algorithm with verification key \(V_i\) to check that \((m, s)\) is valid.

2. He checks that \(V_i\) is consistent with top hash.

Step 1 is done exactly the same as before, i.e., Bob checks that \(H(s^k) = v^k_{m_k}\) for each \(k\).

For step 2, Bob validates \(V_i\) against the hash tree by walking up the tree from leaf \(i\) to root, computing the hash of each node in turn. For this, he uses the hash values stored in \(B_i\). He checks that the final hash value equals the stored top hash.
Authentication Using Passwords
The authentication problem

The authentication problem is to identify with whom one is communicating.

For example, if Alice and Bob are communicating over a network, then Bob would like to know that he is talking to Alice and not to someone else on the network.

Knowing the IP address or URL is not adequate since Mallory might be in control of intermediate routers and name servers.

As with signature schemes, we need some way to differentiate the real Alice from other users of the network.
Possible authentication factors

Alice can be authenticated in one of three ways:

1. By something she knows;
2. By something she possesses;
3. By something she is.

Examples:

1. A secret password;
2. A smart card;
3. Biometric data such as a fingerprint.
Passwords

Assume that Alice possess some secret that is not known to anyone else. She authenticates herself by proving that she knows the secret.

Password mechanisms are widely used for authentication.

In the usual form, Alice authenticates herself by sending her password to Bob.

Bob checks that it matches Alice’s password and grants access.

This is the scheme that is used for local logins to a computer and is also used for remote authentication on many web sites.
Weaknesses of password schemes

Password schemes have two major security weaknesses.

1. Passwords may be exposed to Eve when being used.
2. After Alice authenticates herself to Bob, Bob can use Alice’s password to impersonate Alice.
Passwords authentication schemes

Password exposure

Passwords sent over the network in the clear are exposed to various kinds of eavesdropping, ranging from ethernet packet sniffers on the LAN to corrupt ISP’s and routers along the way.

The threat of password capture in this way is so great that one should never send a password over the internet in the clear.
Some precautions

Users of the old insecure Unix tools should switch to secure replacements such as ssh, slogin, and scp, or kerberized versions of telnet and ftp.

**Do any of you even know what the insecure tools were called?**

Web sites requiring user logins generally use the TSL/SSL (Transport Layer Security/Secure Socket Layer) protocol to encrypt the connection, making it relatively safe to transmit passwords to the site, but some do not.

Depending on how your browser is configured, it will warn you whenever you attempt to send unencrypted data back to the server.
Password propagation

After Alice’s password reaches the server, it is no longer the case that only she knows her password.

Now the server knows it, too!

This is no problem if Alice only uses her password to log into that *particular* server.

However, if she uses the same password for other web sites, the first server can impersonate Alice to any other web site where Alice uses the same password.
Multiple web sites

Users these days typically have accounts with dozens or hundreds of different web sites. (I personally have over 300.)

The temptation is strong to use the same username-password pairs on all sites so that they can be easily remembered.

But then anyone with access to the password database on one site can log into Alice’s account on any of the other sites.

Typically different sites protect data of very differing sensitivity.

An on-line shopping site may only be protecting a customer’s shopping cart, whereas a banking site allows access to a customer’s bank account.
Password policy advice

My advice is, use a different password for each account.

Of course, nobody can keep dozens of different passwords straight, so the downside of my suggestion is that the passwords must be written down and kept safe, or stored in a properly-protected password vault.

If the primary copy gets lost or compromised, then one should have a backup copy so that one can go to all of the sites ASAP and change the passwords (and learn if the site has been compromised).

The real problem with simple password schemes is that Alice is required to send her secrets to other parties in order to use them. We will later explore authentication schemes that avoid this.
Another issue with traditional password authentication schemes is the need to store the passwords on the server for later verification.

- The file in which passwords are store is highly sensitive.
- Operating system protections can (and should) be used to protect it, but they are not sufficient.
- Legitimate sysadmins might use passwords found there to log into users’ accounts at other sites.
- Hackers who manage to break into the computer and obtain root privileges can do the same thing.
- Backup copies may not be subject to the same system protections, so someone with access to a backup device might read everybody’s password from it.
Storing encrypted passwords

Rather than store passwords in the clear, it is usual to store “encrypted” passwords.

That is, the hash value of the password under some cryptographic hash function is stored instead of the password itself.
Using encrypted passwords

The authentication function

- takes the cleartext password from the user,
- computes its hash value,
- compares the computed hash value with the stored value.

Since the password file does not contain the actual password, and it is computationally difficult to invert a cryptographic hash function, knowledge of the hash value does not allow an attacker to easily find the password.
Dictionary attacks on encrypted passwords

Access to an encrypted password file opens up the possibility of a dictionary attack.

Many users choose weak passwords—words that appear in an English dictionary or in other available sources of text.

If one has access to the password hashes of legitimate users on the computer (such as is contained in /etc/passwd on Unix), an attacker can hash every word in the dictionary and then look for matches with the password file entries.
Harm from dictionary attacks

A dictionary attack is quite likely to succeed in compromising at least a few accounts on a typical system.

Even one compromised account is enough to allow the hacker to log into the system as a legitimate user, from which other kinds of attacks are possible that cannot be carried out from the outside.
Salt

Salt is a way to make dictionary attacks more expensive.

- **Salt** is a random number that is stored along with the hashed password in the password file.
- The hash function takes two arguments, password and salt, and produces a hash value.
- Because the salt is stored (in the clear) in the password file, the user’s password can be easily verified.
- The same password hashes differently depending on the salt.
- A successful dictionary attack now has to encrypt the entire dictionary with every salt value that appears in the password file being attacked.
- This increases the cost of the attack by orders of magnitude.