

Finding Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies

Then: X^*, Y^* is an equilibrium in mixed strategies and $\text{value}(A) = E(X^*, Y^*)$

if and only if $E(i, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, j)$ for all i, j
 pure strategy - pick row i
 mixed strategy with $x_i = 1$
 $x_k = 0$ for $k \neq i$
 $(0 \dots 0 \ 1 \ 0 \dots 0)$
 $\leftarrow y_j = 1, y_k = 0$ for $k \neq j$
 $(0 \dots 0 \ 1 \ 0 \dots 0)$
 $\leftarrow x_j$

\Rightarrow Suppose X^*, Y^* is an equilibrium then $\forall X, Y \ E(X, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y)$ def eq.
 $\forall i, j \ E(i, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, j)$ special cases

\Leftarrow Suppose $E(i, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, j)$ for all i, j Let $Y = (y_1, \dots, y_m)$
 Let $X = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ where $0 \leq x_i \leq 1$ and $\sum x_i = 1$
 $E(X, Y^*) = x_1 \cdot E(1, Y^*) + x_2 \cdot E(2, Y^*) + \dots + x_n \cdot E(n, Y^*)$
 $\leq x_1 \cdot E(X^*, Y^*) + x_2 \cdot E(X^*, Y^*) + \dots + x_n \cdot E(X^*, Y^*)$
 $(x_1 + \dots + x_n) E(X^*, Y^*) = E(X^*, Y^*)$
 $\forall X, Y \ E(X, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y)$
 $y_1 \cdot E(X^*, Y^*) \leq y_1 \cdot E(X^*, 1)$
 \vdots
 $y_m \cdot E(X^*, Y^*) \leq y_m \cdot E(X^*, m)$
 $E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y)$

	F	C	S
F	0.30	0.25	0.20
C	0.26	0.33	0.28
S	0.28	0.30	0.33

Claim $X^* = (\frac{2}{7}, 0, \frac{5}{7}) \quad Y^* = (\frac{2}{7}, \frac{2}{7}, 0)$

$E(X^*, Y^*) = \frac{2}{7} \cdot \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.30 + \frac{2}{7} \cdot \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.25 + \frac{5}{7} \cdot \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.28 + \frac{5}{7} \cdot \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.30$

Verify $X^* = (\frac{2}{7}, 0, \frac{5}{7}) \quad Y^* = (\frac{2}{7}, \frac{2}{7}, 0)$ is equilibrium $= \frac{2}{7}$

$v = E(X^*, Y^*) = \frac{2}{7}$

$E(1, Y^*) = \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.30 + \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.25 = \frac{2}{7} \leq \frac{2}{7}$

$E(X^*, 1) = \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.30 + \frac{5}{7} \cdot 0.28 = \frac{200}{700} = \frac{2}{7} \geq \frac{2}{7}$

$E(2, Y^*) = \dots = \frac{196}{700} \leq \frac{2}{7}$

$E(X^*, 2) = \dots = \frac{200}{700} = \frac{2}{7} \geq \frac{2}{7}$

$E(3, Y^*) = \dots = \frac{2}{7} \leq \frac{2}{7}$

$E(X^*, 3) = \dots = \frac{205}{700} \geq \frac{2}{7}$

Is $X = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, 0) \quad Y = (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, 0)$ an equilibrium

$E(X, Y) = 0.285$

$E(1, Y) = 0.275$

$E(X, 1) = \frac{1}{2} \cdot 0.30 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot 0.26 = 0.27$ not ≥ 0.285 not equilibrium

$E(2, Y) = 0.295$ (not \leq) $> .285 \Rightarrow$ not equilibrium

$E(X, 2) = 0.29$

$E(3, Y) = 0.29$

$E(X, 3) = 0.24$

\rightarrow best response

	L	R
L	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
R	1	$\frac{2}{3}$

$X = (x \ 1-x)$

$E(X, 1) = x \cdot \frac{1}{2} + (1-x) \cdot 1 = 1 - \frac{1}{2}x$

$E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, 1)$


$E(X, 2) = x \cdot 1 + (1-x) \cdot \frac{2}{3} = \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}x$


$E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, 2)$

best response to X is $\min(E(X, 1), E(X, 2))$

equilibrium is at max of best response

not ... if $x < 1$ or $x > 1$





equilibrium is at max of best response
 " intersection of $E(X,1)$, $E(Y,Z)$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -1 & 3 \\ 3 & 5 & -3 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$E(X,1) = x + 3(1-x) = 3 - 2x$$

$$E(X,Z) = -1x + 5(1-x) = 5 - 6x$$

$$E(X,Y) = 3x + -3(1-x) = -3 + 6x$$

col 1 not used in equilibrium
 (not on upper envelope around intersection)

$$\text{so } x^* = (0 \text{ y } 1-y)$$

$$E(1,Y) = -1y \cdot 3(1-y) = 3 - 4y$$


$$E(Z,Y) = 5y + -3(1-y) = -3 + 8y$$

$$3 - 4y = -3 + 8y$$

$$6 = 12y$$

$$\frac{1}{2} = y$$

$$Y^* = \left(0 \ \frac{1}{2} \ \frac{1}{2}\right)$$



$$1 - \frac{1}{2}x = \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}x$$

$$\frac{1}{3} = \frac{5}{6}x$$

$$x = \frac{2}{5}$$

$$X^* = \left(\frac{2}{5} \ \frac{3}{5}\right)$$

$$V = 1 - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{2}{5}$$


$$= \frac{4}{5} - \frac{1}{5} = \frac{3}{5}$$

$$E(1,Y) = \frac{1}{2}y + 1 \cdot (1-y) = 1 - \frac{1}{2}y$$

$$E(Z,Y) = y + \frac{2}{3}(1-y) = \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}y$$

same graph by symmetry

$$Y^* = \left(\frac{2}{5} \ \frac{3}{5}\right)$$



$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 & 3 \\ 3 & 5 & -3 \end{pmatrix}$$

Linear Programming

F C S

Maximize $v = \text{minimize } \frac{1}{v}$
subject to

F 0.30 0.25 0.20

$E(X, 1) = 0.30x_1 + 0.26x_2 + 0.28x_3 \geq v$

C 0.26 0.33 0.28

$E(X, 2) = 0.25x_1 + 0.33x_2 + 0.30x_3 \geq v$

S 0.28 0.30 0.33

$E(X, 3) = 0.20x_1 + 0.28x_2 + 0.33x_3 \geq v$

$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$

$x_1, x_2, x_3 \geq 0$

divide by v
 $\frac{x_1}{v} = p_1, \frac{x_2}{v} = p_2, \dots$
and $\neq -1$

$-0.30p_1 - 0.26p_2 - 0.28p_3 \leq -1$
 $-0.25p_1 - 0.33p_2 - 0.30p_3 \leq -1$
 $-0.20p_1 - 0.28p_2 - 0.33p_3 \leq -1$

$0.20 \leq v \leq 0.33$
min payoff max payoff
positive, so v (if not, add C to all payoffs to make positive)
and subtract out after getting soln for value of original game

$p_i = \frac{x_i}{v}$
 $x_1 = 1$
 $\frac{v \geq 0.2}{v} \leq 5$

$0 \leq p_1 \leq 5$
 $0 \leq p_2 \leq 5$
 $0 \leq p_3 \leq 5$

bounds

for Java, convert to =
 $-0.30p_1 - 0.26p_2 - 0.28p_3 + 1s_1 + 0s_2 + 0s_3 = -1$
 $-0.25p_1 - 0.33p_2 - 0.33p_3 + 0s_1 + 1s_2 + 0s_3 = -1$
 $0 \leq s_i \leq 1$

minimize $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = \frac{x_1}{v} + \frac{x_2}{v} + \frac{x_3}{v} = \frac{x_1 + x_2 + x_3}{v} = \frac{1}{v}$

lin prog returns p_i 's and $\frac{1}{v}$; convert back to x_i 's and v

II

minimize v subject to

$E(1, Y) = 0.30y_1 + 0.25y_2 + 0.20y_3 \leq v$

$E(2, Y) = 0.26y_1 + 0.33y_2 + 0.28y_3 \leq v$

$E(3, Y) = 0.28y_1 + 0.30y_2 + 0.33y_3 \leq v$

$y_1 + y_2 + y_3 = 1$
 $y_1, y_2, y_3 \geq 0$

Easier transform leaving v takes longer
418017 vs 197123 iter
threshold 1017 in

divide by v , set $g_i = \frac{y_i}{v}$
(don't need to multiply by -1 bc already \leq)

$0.30g_1 + 0.25g_2 + 0.20g_3 \leq 1$

takes longer
 418017 vs 197123 iter
 through tol2 in
 two-minute init
 and fails sometimes
 ($\sum x_i = \sum y_i = 1$
 to constraining)

5:20
 vs
 3:00
 lot time
 (incl
 matrix
 setup)

no crash
 w/no bounds on v
 and down to 384063 iter

1657815 in 15:41
 867563 in 10:05
 (don't know how much time
 is linprog vs other stuff)

$$\begin{aligned}
 0.30 g_1 + 0.25 g_2 + 0.20 g_3 &\leq 1 \\
 0.26 g_1 + 0.33 g_2 + 0.28 g_3 &\leq 1 \\
 0.28 g_1 + 0.30 g_2 + 0.33 g_3 &\leq 1
 \end{aligned}$$

a_2
 bub

$$\begin{aligned}
 0 &\leq g_1 \leq 5 \\
 0 &\leq g_2 \leq 5 \\
 0 &\leq g_3 \leq 5
 \end{aligned}$$

bounds

minimize $-g_1 - g_2 - g_3 = -\frac{1}{v}$ (same as max $\frac{1}{v}$,
 same as min v)

non-constant term

$$E_I(X, Y) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m x_i \cdot y_j \cdot a_{ij}$$

$$E_{II}(X, Y) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m x_i \cdot y_j \cdot b_{ij}$$

nonlinear (and appear in objective fun
 in system to optimize)

non-linear programming