

## Value Iteration

Initialize  $v[s] \leftarrow 0$  for terminal  $s$   
 $\leftarrow$  arbitrary for nonterminal  $s$

repeat

$\Delta \leftarrow 0$   
for each state  $s$


$v_{old} \leftarrow v[s]$

$v[s] \leftarrow \sum_{s'} \sum_r P(s', r | s, a) \cdot (r + \gamma v_{\pi}(s'))$

$\Delta \leftarrow \max(\Delta, |v[s] - v_{old}|)$


until  $\Delta$  small enough

for each  $s$   
 $\pi[s] \leftarrow$



# Simultaneous Play Games

		II		
		R	P	S
I	Rock	0, 0	-1, 1	1, -1
	Paper	-1, 1	0, 0	-1, 1
	Scissors	-1, 1	1, -1	0, 0



		II	
		I	B
I	A	0	-1
	B	-1	0

zero-sum: payoff for I + payoff for II

Penalty Kick

		goalkeeper	
		L	R
kicker	L	1/8, -1/8	1/4, -1/4
	R	1/6, -1/6	1/6, -1/6

(zero-sum "saddle point" equilibrium)



$a_{ij}$  = payoff for I when I chooses action i, II chooses j

constant-sum:  $a_{ij} + b_{ij} = C$

		II			
		W	X	Y	Z
I	A	1/2	3/4	1/2	1/2
	B	-1	-1	1/3	1/2
	C	-1	1/2	0	1/2

max in col and min in row

zero-sum → 1) play game with  $A - C$   
 no strategy → 2) award player I add payoff C

$v^-$  = amt I can guarantee = max of row mins

$v^+$  = amt II can guarantee not to exceed = min of col maxes

## Stag Hunt

		II	
		S	H
I	Stag	2, 2	0, 1
	Hare	1, 0	1, 1

$R > T = P > S$

## Prisoners Dilemma

		II	
		Coop	Defect
I	Coop	3, 3	0, 5
	Defect	5, 0	1, 1

equilibrium

- R = reward for cooperating
- P = punishment for defecting
- S = sucker's reward
- T = reward for temptation
- $T > R > P > S$