

## Finding Saddle Points in Mixed Strategies

Thm:  $X^*, Y^*$  is a saddle point in mixed strategies and  $\text{value}(A) = E(X^*, Y^*)$

if and only if  $E(i, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, j)$  for all  $i, j$

⇒ Suppose  $X^*, Y^*$  is a saddle point. For any  $i, j$  let  $X = (0 \dots 1 \dots 0)$   
 $Y = (0 \dots 1 \dots 0)$

By def of saddle point,  $E(i, Y^*) = E(X, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, j) = E(X^*, Y)$   
as required

⇐ Call saddle point (we know there is one)  $X_0, Y_0 = (y_1 \dots y_m)$   
 $\hookrightarrow = (x_1 \dots x_n)$

$$\begin{aligned} y_1 E(X^*, Y^*) &\leq y_1 E(X^*, 1) \\ y_2 E(X^*, Y^*) &\leq y_2 E(X^*, 2) \\ &\vdots \\ y_m E(X^*, Y^*) &\leq y_m E(X^*, m) \end{aligned}$$

$$x_1 E(1, Y^*) \leq x_1 E(X^*, Y^*)$$

$$(y_1 + \dots + y_m) E(X^*, Y^*) \leq y_1 E(X^*, 1) + \dots + y_m E(X^*, m) \leq E(X_0, Y_0) \leq E(X^*, Y_0)$$

$$x_n E(X_n, Y^*) \leq x_n E(X^*, Y^*)$$

$$E(X_0, Y^*) \leq E(X^*, Y^*)$$

didn't use the fact that  $Y_0$  is from saddle point, so works for any  $Y$

def saddle point

all  $\leq$  are = (squeeze) so  $E(X^*, Y^*) = E(X_0, Y_0) = \text{value}(A)$  and  $X^*, Y^*$  is a saddle point

		pitcher		
		F	C	S
batter	F	0.30	0.25	0.20
	C	0.26	0.33	0.28
	S	0.28	0.30	0.33

$$X^* = \left( \frac{2}{7} \quad 0 \quad \frac{5}{7} \right) \quad Y^* = \left( \frac{5}{7} \quad \frac{2}{7} \quad 0 \right)$$

$$E(X^*, Y^*) = \frac{2}{7} = X^* \cdot A \cdot Y^{*T}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{I} \Rightarrow E(X^*, 1) &= \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.30 + \frac{5}{7} \cdot 0.28 = \frac{200}{700} \geq \frac{2}{7} \quad \checkmark \\ E(X^*, 2) &= \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.25 + \frac{5}{7} \cdot 0.30 = \frac{200}{700} \geq \frac{2}{7} \quad \checkmark \\ E(X^*, 3) &= \frac{2}{7} \cdot 0.2 + \frac{5}{7} \cdot 0.33 = \frac{201}{700} \geq \frac{2}{7} \quad \checkmark \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{I} \Rightarrow E(1, Y^*) &= \frac{2}{7} \leq \frac{2}{7} \quad \checkmark \\ E(2, Y^*) &= \frac{196}{700} \leq \frac{2}{7} \quad \checkmark \\ E(3, Y^*) &= \frac{2}{7} \leq \frac{2}{7} \quad \checkmark \end{aligned}$$

So  $X^*, Y^*$  is a saddle point

Suppose there are two saddle points in mixed strategies  $(X_1^*, Y_1^*) (X_2^*, Y_2^*)$

$$\begin{aligned} E(X_1^*, Y_2^*) &\leq E(X_2^*, Y_2^*) \\ &\leq E(X_2^*, Y_1^*) \\ &\leq E(X_1^*, Y_1^*) \\ &\leq E(X_1^*, Y_2^*) \end{aligned}$$

## Finding Solutions for 2x2 payoff matrix

	L	R
L	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
R	1	$\frac{2}{3}$

$$(x_1, x_2) = (x_1, 1-x_1)$$

For saddle point  $X^*, Y^* \rightarrow (y_1, 1-y_1)$

$$E(X^*, 1) \geq E(X^*, Y^*) = v$$


$$x_1 \cdot \frac{1}{2} + (1-x_1) \cdot 1 = 1 - \frac{1}{2}x_1 \geq v$$

I wants to maximize  $v$

$$E(X^*, 2) \geq E(X^*, Y^*) = v$$

$$x_1 \cdot 1 + (1-x_1) \cdot \frac{2}{3} = \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}x_1 \geq v$$

$$E(1, Y^*) \leq v \quad \frac{1}{2}y_1 + 1(1-y_1) = 1 - \frac{1}{2}y_1 \leq v$$



$$E(1, y^*) \leq v \quad \frac{1}{2}y_1 + 1(1-y_1) = 1 - \frac{1}{2}y_1 \leq v$$

$$E(2, y^*) \leq v \quad 1 \cdot y_1 + \frac{2}{3}(1-y_1) = \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}y_1 \leq v$$

(same graph as for  $x_1$  vs  $v$ )

intersection gives  $x_1 = \frac{2}{5}$  so  $x_2 = \frac{3}{5}$   $v = \frac{4}{5}$

and  $y_1 = \frac{2}{5}$   $y_2 = \frac{3}{5}$

$$x^* = \left( \frac{2}{5} \quad \frac{3}{5} \right) = y^* \text{ is saddle point}$$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & -1 & 3 \\ 3 & 5 & -3 \end{pmatrix}$$

$(x_1, 1-x_1)$



$$E(x_1) = 1 \cdot x_1 + (1-x_1) \cdot 3 = 3 - 2x_1 \geq v$$

$$E(x_2) = -1 \cdot x_1 + (1-x_1) \cdot 5 = 5 - 6x_1 \geq v$$

$$E(x_3) = 3 \cdot x_1 + (1-x_1) \cdot -3 = -3 + 6x_1 \geq v$$


$$E(1, y) = -1 \cdot y_2 + 3(1-y_2) = 3 - 4y_2 \leq v$$

$$E(2, y) = 5 \cdot y_2 + -3 \cdot (1-y_2) = -3 + 8y_2 \leq v$$



$$y^* = \left( 0 \quad \frac{1}{2} \quad \frac{1}{2} \right)$$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & -1 & 3 \\ 3 & 5 & -3 \end{pmatrix}$$



# Linear Programming

	F	C	S
F	0.30	0.25	0.20
C	0.26	0.33	0.28
S	0.28	0.30	0.33

Maximize  $v$  = minimize  $\frac{1}{v}$   
subject to

$$E(X, 1) = 0.30x_1 + 0.26x_2 + 0.28x_3 \geq v$$

$$E(X, 2) = 0.25x_1 + 0.33x_2 + 0.30x_3 \geq v$$

$$E(X, 3) = 0.20x_1 + 0.28x_2 + 0.33x_3 \geq v$$

$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = 1$$

$$x_1, x_2, x_3 \geq 0$$

divide by  $v$   
 $\frac{x_1}{v} = p_1, \frac{x_2}{v} = p_2, \dots$   
and  $\ast -1$

$$\begin{aligned} -0.30p_1 - 0.26p_2 - 0.28p_3 &\leq -1 \\ -0.25p_1 - 0.33p_2 - 0.30p_3 &\leq -1 \\ -0.20p_1 - 0.28p_2 - 0.33p_3 &\leq -1 \end{aligned}$$

$0.20 \leq v \leq 0.33$   
min payoff                      max payoff  
positive, so  $\ddot{u}$  (if not, add  $C$  to all payoffs to make positive)  
and subtract out after getting soln for value of original game

$$p_i = \frac{x_i}{v}$$

$$x_1 = 1$$

$$\frac{v \geq 0.2}{v} \leq 5$$

bounds

$$\begin{aligned} 0 \leq p_1 &\leq 5 \\ 0 \leq p_2 &\leq 5 \\ 0 \leq p_3 &\leq 5 \end{aligned}$$

for Java, convert to =

$$\begin{aligned} -0.30p_1 - 0.26p_2 - 0.28p_3 + s_1 + 0s_2 + 0s_3 &= -1 \\ -0.25p_1 - 0.33p_2 - 0.33p_3 + 0s_1 + s_2 + 0s_3 &= -1 \\ &\vdots \\ 0 \leq s_i &\leq 1 \end{aligned}$$

minimize  $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 \leq \frac{x_1}{v} + \frac{x_2}{v} + \frac{x_3}{v} = \frac{x_1 + x_2 + x_3}{v} = \frac{1}{v}$

lin prog returns  $p_i$ 's and  $\frac{1}{v}$ ; convert back to  $x_i$ 's and  $v$

## II

minimize  $v$  subject to

$$E(1, Y) = 0.30y_1 + 0.25y_2 + 0.20y_3 \leq v$$

$$E(2, Y) = 0.26y_1 + 0.33y_2 + 0.28y_3 \leq v$$

$$E(3, Y) = 0.28y_1 + 0.30y_2 + 0.33y_3 \leq v$$

$$\begin{aligned} y_1 + y_2 + y_3 &= 1 \\ y_1, y_2, y_3 &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

divide by  $v$ , set  $g_i = \frac{y_i}{v}$   
(don't need to multiply by  $-1$  bc already  $\leq$ )

$$0.30g_1 + 0.25g_2 + 0.20g_3 \leq 1$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 0.30 g_1 + 0.25 g_2 + 0.20 g_3 &\leq 1 \\
 0.26 g_1 + 0.33 g_2 + 0.28 g_3 &\leq 1 \\
 0.28 g_1 + 0.30 g_2 + 0.33 g_3 &\leq 1
 \end{aligned}$$

$a_{ij}$

bub

$$\begin{aligned}
 0 &\leq g_1 \leq 5 \\
 0 &\leq g_2 \leq 5 \\
 0 &\leq g_3 \leq 5
 \end{aligned}$$

bounds

minimize  $-g_1 + -g_2 + -g_3 = -\frac{1}{v}$  (same as max  $\frac{1}{v}$ , same as min  $v$ )

$$E_I(X, Y) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n x_i \cdot y_j \cdot a_{ij}$$

nonlinear (and appear in objective fun in system to optimize)

$$E_{II}(X, Y) = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n x_i \cdot y_j \cdot b_{ij}$$

non-linear programming

field position, down + distance, time remaining

$$\text{Let } E[\text{pos}] = P(\text{offense wins}) = P(\text{score TD on current possession})$$

↑  
simplifying assumption

$$\text{Then } E[\text{pos}] = \text{value} \begin{pmatrix} a_{11} & a_{12} & a_{13} \\ a_{21} & a_{22} & a_{23} \\ a_{31} & a_{32} & a_{33} \end{pmatrix}$$

where  $a_{ij}$  = value of running offensive play  $i$  against defensive play  $j$

$$= \sum_{\text{outcome } o} P(o) \cdot E[\text{next}(\text{pos}, o)]$$

position that results from  
outcome  $o$  in position  $\text{pos}$

(yards gained, time elapsed, turnover)

So need dynamic programming + linear programming

↓  
already done!  $E[\text{pos}]$   
in pickle file / csv file  
for all positions  $\text{pos}$

- 1) populate matrix, adjust guarantee positive value
- 2) set up linear programs
- 3) display results (prob dist for offense + defense + value of game)